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After studyingthe problemsof administering
road user taxes in 19developingcountries,Bahl
reportsthe following,amongother things:
* There is no single,correctstructurefor
road user taxationsince the variouschargesmay
playdifferentroles in differentnationalrevenue
systems.
* All effectivetax administrationrequires
a solid, uncomplicatedtax structure.
* The substantialrevenuepotentialof road
user taxationrests on a growingtax base. Despite this, road user taxationremains an
underusedsourceof public financein developing
countries.
* Tax evasionand avoidancenarrowthe
tax base, cost governmentsrevenue,and compromisethe efficiencyand redistributionobjectives
of a tax system. Evasionmay occurby
nonfiling,underreporting,or smuggling. It
generallyincreaseswith the tax rates (particulady the marginaltax rates) and decreaseswith a
greaterprobabilityof detectionand with a more
severepenalty.Avoidanceis the resultof
loopholesin a tax system that enable a taxpayer
to reduceliability by adjustingthe consumption
or compositionof receivedincome,or by making
different investmentor productionchoices.
* The problemsof evasionand avoidance
must be approachedsimultanteously.If a tax

adminritrationnarrowsthe possibilityfor
successfulevasion,the resultmay be an increase
in avoidance.
* The four main types of road user charges
are (1) fuel tax, (2) sales tax, excise tax, and
import duty, (3) annuallicense and vehicle
registrationcharges,and (4) tolls.
* Action shouldbe takenunder all four
main reformoptions (1) to keep rate levels as
low as possible,(2) to broadenthe tax base, limit
exemptions,and movetoward a singleuniform
tax rate, (3) to simplifytaxesto minimize
ambiguity,ease administration,reduceadministrative cost, and lower the compliancecost, and
(4) to improvetax enforcementby improvingtax
collection, record-keeping,liability assessment,
and identificationof those liableto pay the tax.
* Transportfuelpricing needs to be better
coordinated,and rate structures- especiallyfor
sales tax, excise tax, and importduty - could be
loweredand made moreuniform. In some
countriesthere is scopefor raising fueltax and
the annuallicense tax, providedit is accompaniedby better enforcement.Evidencefoundin
the case studiesfor this paperhave not supported
an incentivesargument:that taxpayerswill be
moreinclinedto pay if they see a direct benefit
betweentax and spending.
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EXECTIVE SUMMARY
i.
The following chapters are based on research into the problems ;1 f road usor tax
administrationIn 19 developingcountries. The introductionposits three concepts that underlie
the work. First, there is no single, correct structure for road user taxation since the various
charges may play different roles in any national revenue system. Second, all effective tax
administrationrequires a solid, uncomplicatedtax structure. Third, the revenue potentialof road
user taxationis not only substantial,but rests on a growing tax base. In spite of this, road user
taxation remains an under-used source of public finance in less developed countries.
General Background
ii.
Parts I and II place road user taxation in the context of the broader fiscal problems
facing developingcountries. These problems include debt burdens, high inflation, budgetary
imbalances, deficient public services, high marginal tax rates, and varying rates of economic
growth. Contributingto these are tax evasion and tax avoidance. The most frequent response
to revenue shortfalls in developingcountriesis to use increasedcustomsduties, higher sales and
excise tax rates, and highly progressive income tax structures. All of these are thought to have
a negative economic impact and to incite non-compliancewith the tax system.
iin.
Evasion and avoidance narrow the tax base, cost govermmentsrevenue, and
compromisethe efficiencyand redistributionobjectivesof a tax system. Evasion may occur by
non-filing,under-reporting,or smuggling. It generally increaseswith the tax rates (particularly
the marginal tax rates), and decreases with a greater probability of detection and with a more
severe penalty. Avoidanceis the result of loopholes in a tax system that enable a taxpayer to
reduce liability by adjustingthe consumptionor compositionof receivedincome, or by maling
different investmentor production choices.
iv.
The problems of evasion and avoidanceneed to be approached simultaneously. If a
tax administrationgreatly narrows the possibility for successfulevasion, the result may be an
increase in avoidance. Strategies to improve tax administration and reduce evasion and
avoidancecenter on: (1) lowering marginal tax rates; (2) broadening tax bases by eliminating
exemptionsand many preferential treatments;(3) increasing the transactioncost for using legal
loopholes; (4) tightening the control of the tax authority and monitoring questionablecases;
(5) discouraging under-reporting by using presumptive assessments and regular audits;
(6) preparing a full tax roil and reducing compliance cost; and (7) increasing penalty rates,
discouragingnegotiatedsettlementsand tax amnesties, and increasing (government)willingness
to prosecute.
Road TransportTaxation
v.
Transport taxes are divided into two broad categories - general revenue taxes and
road user charges. The former are levied on transport related activities as part of national
revenue policy, while the latter are differentiallyhigher taxes levied on the transport sector.
Part m focuses on the four main sets of road user charges: (1) fuel tax; (2) sales tax, excise

ii
tax, and importduty; (3) annuallicenseand vehicleregistrationcharges;and (4) tolls. Withn
eachof theseare manytypesof specificlevies.
vi.
Fuel tax. Fiel tax is the dominantsource of revenuereceivedfrom the transport
sector, oftenaccountingfor half of all transportrelatedrevenues. The attractionof fuel tax is
that it has a large tax base that grows in propoidon to GDP, is relativelyprice inelasticin
demand,and is easilyadministeredwithrelativelyfewdistributorsand fewpointsof distributeJn
(fueltax maybe incomeelasticif a specific(pergallon)tax rateis not leviedandif governments
do not allow the taxableprice to increasewith the marketprice)). The taxpayeris aily
identified,complianceis easilymonitored,and levelsof evasionand avoWince are low. Fuel
tax, however,is not usuallydesignedas a proportionalbenefitslevy. Therelationshipbetween
total collectionand total road expenditurevaries widely. Fuel is taxed in severalways.
Importedpetroleumis subjectto customsduty;domesticrefineriesare subjectto excisetax; the
statemonopolyonpetroleumproductsmaybe taxedon its retainedearnings;retailsalestax may
be imposedon the pumpprice; and the pumpprice may be set above (below)productioncost,
implying a tax (subsidy). Some countriesuse one of these tax forms and others use a
comoination. The aim of fuel rate differentiationcenterson incomedistribution,subsidizing
publictransportation,keepingprices for non-transportfuel use low, and encouragingindustrial
development.However,differentialfuel prices betweencontiguouscountriesand alternative
transportfuelswill encourageevasionand avoidance. Gasolineusersavoidpayinghigh tax by
switchingto diesel-engined
vehicles,or adulteratingfuelwitha cheapersubstitute.Theyevade
payingtax by illegallymisclassifyingtheiruse underan exemptcategory(suchas agriculture),
or smugglingfuelto/fromothercountries.
vii.
Salestax, excisetax, and hnport duty. Motorvehiclesand motorvehicleparts may
be taxedat pointof sale, at pointof manufacture,and at pointof import. Mostcountriesuse
all three stages. Tax rate, base size, and the extent of preferentialtreatmentvary greatly
between countries. Revenue from these taxes is rarely earmarkedfor expenditureon
transportationservices,but contributesto generalrevenueand generaleconomicpolicy.
viii.
Generalsalestaxis amongthemostdifficultto administer.Thesystemis complicated
and the tax rate is oftenhigh. Of the largenumberof potentialtaxpayers,manyfailto register.
Loopholes,ambiguities,and a high tax rate encourageavoidance. Taxpayerslook for an
opportunityto shift theirpurchaseor productionto an exemptactivity,or to one subjectto a
lowertax rate. Theymaysubmitexaggeratedrefundclaims,makeunrecordedcashsales,claim
ineligiblecredits,and under-reportsales.
ix.
Importduty may be the most difficultto administer. The rate structureis usually
complex,rates are high, compliancecost maybe high, and administrationis oftenweak. The
resultis considerablescopefor undervaluation
and misclassification
(intolowerrate categories).
Discretionaryexemptionsand a low probabilityof detectionaid avoidance. Customsstaffare
not fidly trained, do not use proper procedures, and often are responsiblefor making
clatsificationdecisions.Contactbetweencustomsofficersand taxpayersencouragescorruption
and negotiatedsettlements.

iii

x.
Excise tax and manufacturer'ssales tax are easier to administerand have a high
collectionrate. Thisis due to fewertaxpayers,to lessambiguity(excisetax is due whengoods
are moved),and to the physicalcontrolof goodsat the manufacturingsite, makingmonitoring
and enforcementeasier.
xi.

Annual license and vehicle regtration

charges.

Vehicles are subject to a

registrationchargewhenpurchased,and an annualtax thereafter. Revenuefromthesecharges
varies fromiinsignificantin mostof the countriesstudiedhere, to about one-fifthof transport
sectorrevenuein India. Theannuallicensetax is difficultto administer.It reachesa broadand
growingbase, but usuallywitha low specificrate, The structureis complex,recordkeeping
is poor, enforcementis lax, and penaltyis low. 'he compliancecost is usuallyhigh, often
requiringdocumentedproof of compliancewith numerousotherregulationsbeforethe license
tax maybe paid.
xii.
Tols. Toll chargesare easy to administer,but costly to collect. Monitoringis
difficult,compliancecost is high, and toll-boothoperatorsare easily corrupted. In most
countries,tolls are a minorrevenuesource,usuallyrelatedto a speciticproject. Electronictoll
collectionsystemscouldreduce someevasionand are now relativelyinexpensiveto install.
Reform Options
xiii.
The realiation of greaterrevenuepotentialfrom transportsectortaxationrequiresa
combinationof administrative
andpolicychanges.Manyof the presentsystemsweredeveloped
to satisfya varietyof macrceconomic
and politicalobjectives,only one of whichmightbe the
improvementof road transportservices. A choiceto strengthentransportsectortaxationmay
requirea tradeoffwith other objectives.Two themesmustunderpinany reformplans. First,
the tax structure must be set right before the administrationcan be redesigned. Second,
governmenits
shouldthinkin termsof policiesthat reducethe incentivesto non-compliance
and
policiesthatincreasethe expectedcostof evasion. Part IV focuseson fourinterrelatedelements
of tax reform.
xiv.
Rate levels. Ratelevels,particularlymaga tax rate levels,shouldbe kept as low
as possibleto reduce the incentivefor evasion,for avoidance,and for changingconsumption
patterns. However,high rates are not a majorcause for the failureof transporttax to realize
full revenuepotential. Motorfuel, the mostimportantbase, is probablyunder-taxedin most
countries,and a rate increasecould Likelybe absorbedwith litle, if any, loss in collection
efficiency. Stricteretiforcement,ratherthan increasedrates, is the betterapproach.
xv.
Uniformity. Tax reform shouldconcentrateon broadeningthe tax base, limiting
exemptions,and movingtoward a single uniformtax rate. Rate differentiationshouldbe
limited. Thelowerprice and the lowerta rate on dieseldo not clearlyresultin cost equityfor
the poorer consumers- theybring a revenueloss and subsidizethe largestbeneficiaryof road
expenditure(industrialand commercialtrucks).

iv
xvi.
Simplcatlon. Tax reform shouldemphasizesimplificationof the tax structureto
minimizeambiguity, to ease administration,to reduce administrativecost, and to lower
compliancecost. A tax structurewithonly a few rates and classificationswouldincreasethe
probabilityof detectionfor importersundervaluinggoods, and reducethe avenuesfor goods
reclassification.Sales taxationcouldbe simplifiedby using the value-addedtax or the retail
sales tax. Severalsuggestionshavebeen madeto simplifythe annuallicensetax, but none of
thosetried is sufficienton its own and severalhave drawbacks.
xvii.
Enforcement and penalty. These are the keys to better tax administration.
Taxpayerswill not respond to lower rates and a simplerrate structurealone. Improving
enforcementrequiresimprovingfour stepsin the administrationof any tax: collection,recordkeeping,assessmentof tax liability,and identificationof thoseliableto pay the tax.
Transport TaxationReform
xviii. Better admini' Ationof road user taxes requiresaction under all four of the above
headings.In particular,transportfuelpricingneedsto be bettercoordinated,andrate structures
-

especially for sales tax, excise tax, and import duty - could be lowered and made more

uniform. In some countriesthere is scope for raising fuel tax and the annual license tax,
providedit is accompaniedby betterenforcement.An incentivesargumentthat taxpayerswill
be moreinclinedto pay if they see a directbenefitbetweentax and expenditurehas not shown
itself in the case studiesfor this paper to be viable. The causesof avoidance,of evasion,and
of the failureto reachfull revenuepotentialare withintax structuresand administrations.Here
is wherereforms mustbe made.

I. INTRODUCTION
1.
RoadUser Taxation(RUT)is an underutilizedsourceof publicfinancingin developing
countries. The base of the tax (motorfuel consumptionand the numberand value of motor
vehicles)is growing. The generalviewis thatroaduserscan pay moretax, thatto chargethem
on the basis of vehiclesize or gasolineconsumptionis fair, that highertransporttax reduces
congestionand pollution,and that motor fueltax is easilyadministered.
Despitemeetingall of these maxims,RUT is rarely a mainstayof tax systemsin
2.
developingcountries. Some of the reasonsfor this includepoliticalopposition,fear that
increased transport tax might cripple economic development,assessmentand collection
difficultieswiththe non-fuelcomponentsof RUT,and problemswiththerate andbasestructure.
This paper deals principallywith the latter two constraints,and about the policy and
administrationoptionsopen to moveRUT towardfull realizationof its revenuepotential.
Threequestionsunderliethiswork. First, do successfulcountrypracticeand normative
3.
rinciplestell us there is arght way tQstructureRUT? No. These taxes and chargesplay
manydifferentrolesin nationalrevenuesystems. In onecountry,the objectiveof RUTmaybe
rationingroad use, in anotherit maybe financingconstructionand maintenanceof the highway
network,and in othersit maybe generalrevenuesupport. To complicatemattersfurther,taxes
policies,suchas the needto conserve
on the transportsectormaybe drivenby macroeconomic
foreignexchangeor protectdomesticindustry.
Second,are there genericrules that lead to betteradministrationof KIW Yes. A key
4.
rule is that effectiveadministrationrequiresa solid tax structure. On the basis of the case
studies reviewed here, there are correctableproblems in all areas of tax administration:
assessment,collection,recordkeeping,and identificationof tax bases.
Third, whatis the revenuepotentialof RK? Thoughstatisticsare not alwaysavailable
5.
(governmentstend to collectrevenuedataby typeof taxratherthanby object),thecomparisons
in Table1 suggestan 11percentsharein totaltaxesis not unusual;a share in the neighborhood
of 19percent,as in Indiaand CostaRica, is possible. Five countries,in this sampleof 19, tax
the transportsector at a rate greater than 2 percentof GDP. Using thesebenchmarks,and
recognizingthateven thesehighernumbersdo not takeintoaccountevasionand avoidance,one
concludesthat many less developedcountries(LDCs)have a substantialcapacityto expand
RUT.
The next sectionexaminesthe generalsettingfor evaluatingtax administrationin the
6.
problemfor
transportsector. The topicscoveredincludethe natureoe -heevasion/avoidance
and the directionsin which
LDC taxesin general,the standardremediesfor non-compliance,
tax systemreformwoulddo
in
transport
years.
Those
interested
has
turned
in
recent
tax policy
is summarizedin Sectionm and
well to starthere. A generalmodelof tax evasion/avoidance
presentedin moredetailin AnnexA.

2

7.
Thepresentpracticeof transportsectortaxationis describedin somedetailin SectionIV,
with reference to eight case studies prepared for this Project.A' These cases show wide
variatiornsin compliance,revenue performance,administrativepractice, the use of tax
instruments,and rate and base structure. The final sectionlooksat policyand administrative
reform. Has the LDC experiencewith tax administrationin general,and transporttax in
particular,taughtus howbest to structureand administera systemof taxesandchargeson motor
vehiclesand roadways?
8.
Somecaveatsshouldbe mentioned.Thisreportdiscussestransporttax, but is primarily
concernedwith motor vehiclesand road use. Airportsare mentionedonly in passing, and
railroadsand seaportsare not discussed. Heavyrelianceis placed on the resultsfrom a small
numberof case studiesthatmayor maynot be representative.Wherepossible,the resultsfrom
othercountrystudiesare reviewed,but theseare neithercomparablein u.esenseof the questions
asked,nor are theypresentedin the samelevelof detail. Finally,in someof the discussionthe
terms tax and chargeare loosely used. This is partly a shorthandconvenienceand partly
becausethe traditionaldistinctionsare blurredamongseveralof the commonlyusedinstruments
of transporttaxation. Wherethe distinctionis importantit is clearlymade.

I/

Argentina,Bolivia,Ghana,India,hIdonesia,Nepal,Tanzaniaand Yugoslavia.
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Table 1: Motor Fuel and Total Tllsport Tax
In Nrin
DevelopingCoumtries

Tax on Motor Fuel

Percent Percent
Country

Year

1. Atgeria

1984

2. Argentina

1987

3. Sol-vla

1988

4. Cotombia

1986

S. Costa Rlca

of
TotalTax

Per

of
GOP

Capita
(S US)

0.0

0.7

Percentage of Road
Expenditurl collected
Road
Motor
User
Fuet
Total Transoort Tax
ES
I

Perct

of
TotalTax

Perent

Per

of
GOP

Capita
(S US)

0.0

1.2

155.2

148.0

190.9

158.4

3.0

70.9

0.6

3.9

6.4

0.7

8.4

89.4

32.1

53.9

18.8

3.5

60.8

148.1

131.4

0.4

0.5

5.2

0.9

1.0

71.7

32.7

0.2
0.6

0.7 A/
2.0

0.0
4.8

0.0
0.6

0.0
2.1

34.2

32.3

7.9

0.9

6.8

16.1

1.7

13.8

1988

7.9

0.9

0.1

19.0

2.1

0.2

10. Indoreiaf

1986

4.0

0.6

2.5

7.4

1.2

4.7

II. Jamaica

1984

7.5

1.7

0.1

3.0

12. mepal

1985

4.3

0.3

0.5

13.4

1.0

1.4

13. Pakistan

1985

5.2

0.6

2.0

16.0

1.8

6.2

14. Phitippines

1986

9.1

1.0

5.1

11.6

1.2

6.5

IS. Sri Lanka

1985

7.8

1.4

5.5

12.9

2.4

16. Tanuania

1986
1987

3.4

0.4
0.6

0.9
0.9

13.1

1.7
1.8

17. Thatland

1985

9.0

1.3

9.4

13.5

1.9

18. Tunisia

198S

2.7

0.7

7.6

4.9

19. Zaire

1985

7.1

1.2

1.7

7.3

1.7

41.0

O.S

3.3

2.3

0.2

3.0

1986

16.7

3.1

6. Ethiopia

1985

2.4

. Chana

1988
1987

1.3
4.5

8. Guatemala

1988

9. India

Medin
ean

V

ROd fund only.
P

6.6

6.6
6.1
The totat

0.6
0.9

2.0
7.4

11.4

11.6
10.1

62.6
162.0

98.6

239.4

78.0

9.1

448.1

270.0

3.6
2.5

176.1

64.4

14.0

198.4

132.6

1.2

¶3.7

153.7

85.1

1.2

1.7

57.3

56.2

1.7
1.5

Is estimated to be three times this amount.

4.7
11.3

155.2
163.4

78.0
98.7
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IH. THE PROBLEM
9.
This report tries to answer the followingquestions on the use of transport tax and the
problems of evasion and avoidance:
*

How urgent is the need to improve tax effort in developingcountries?

*

What is the magnitudeof tax evasion in the transport sector, and are there significant
gains to be had from better enforcement?

*

What policy instruments are currently used for dealing with complianceand what role
can they play as part of an agenda for improvingenforcementof transport tax?

*

How can policy makers reconcile the revenue raising and resource allocation objectives
of transport tax?

iWA Problems in LDCs
10. The 1988 World DevelopmentReport (World Bank, p. 182), describes the poor conduct
of fiscal policy in developing countriesas leading to "... heavy foreign borrowing, high
inflation, and stagnant private investment". The economic patterns and fiscal problems facing
low-income countries vary and in each produce a different response, making generalizations
difficult. However, some fiscal situationsoccur repeatedly in many countries.
11. One is that govemment expendituredrives the problems of budgetary imbalancein low
income countries. In most cases, the ratio of tax to GNP is remarkably stable, but the
expenditure share may increase dramaticallyover short periods of time. This creates short run
(in some cases long run), situations of substantial deficit and inflationary financing. The
following common situations explaining the inability of governments to control spending are
observed in LDCs:
*

Public services are deficient, and pressure to upgrade and fill the most severe
gaps is intense. In response, governmentsoften spend for capital improvements
even when their forecasted tax revenue will not support the expenditures.
Governmentsborrow without the capacity to repay, do not adequately maintain
existing capital stock, and do not operate some facilities to proper standards.

*

Central govemment budgets are squeezed by public employee compensation
demands, demands to increase transfers to local governments,and the increasing
price of non-labor inputs (utilities, asphalt, gasoline, and so on). Inflation
exacerbates these pressures.

5

*

Debt repaymentexerts a fixed and often substantialclaim on availableresources.

*

Govemment budgets are politicized and tend to expand during elections. Often
public employment rolls are "padded" as governments take on the role of
employer of last resort.

*

Inefficient service delivery adds to the burden.

12.
Some governments are unwillingto exert a tax effort to close the public services gap.
The Philippines and Guatemala are countries whose tax burden is inordinatelylow by world
standards. A normal tax effort in either of these countries would all but eliminate the budget
defiJ0t In other cases the average tax rate, relative to GDP, is not low, but the gap persists.
This could be due to one or both of the following reasons: First, the deficit is primarily a
problem of overspendingrelative to revenue intake; second, the high (or even normal), average
tax rate translates into a high marginalrate because only a narrow segment of economicactivity
is taxed.
&oidance and Evasion
13. Individuals and companies reduce their tax liabilities by a variety of legal and illegal
means. Avoiding or evading taxes hinders the public sector's revenue generation. This is
especiallytrue in developingcountries where tax enforcementis weak and where the informal
sector of the economy is hard to taxY The revenue loss from noncomplianceexacerbates a
serious problem resulting from deficient infrastructure, low taxable capacity, inadequatepublic
services, and substantialdebt repaymentobligations. Developingcountriesoften respondto the
revenue shortfallby raisitig sales and excise taxes, increasingcustomsduty, and enforcinghighly
progressive income tax structures. However, high marginal rates of taxation are thought to
discouragesome productiveactivities, to distort some economicdecisions,and to provide furither
incentive for noncompliance. As a way out of this dilemma, virtually every fiscal reform
program for developing and developed countries recommends base expansion, removing
exemptions, lowering tax rates, and improving tax administration.
14.
EZ=gmjtins. Under personal income tax, it is not uncommonfor interest income from
bank deposits to be tax free. Other commonlyexempted items are capital gains and income
f-om fringe benefits. In most countries the income tax base from companies is eroded by tax

V

The United States faces much the same situation.

a/

Thoroughstatementsof developingcountry fiscal and tax administrationproblemscan be foundin Richard Ooode
(1984), Richard Bird (1983), and G. K. Shaw(1981).
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incentivesthat grantseveralformsof preferentialtreatmentto qualifyingfirmsin an attemptto
increaseeconomicdevelopment.
15. The indirecttax base is also dilutedby exemptionsand preferentialtax treatment. A
varietyof importsare duty-free,or are taxedat preferentialrates. The value-addedtax (VAI)
in most LDCs exemptsa good part of the servicesector,zero rates manycommodities,and
eitherdoesnot tax smallerfirms,or taxesthemat nominalrates.
16.

A key problem in designingtax reform - particularlyincome tax reform - is the poorly

understoodrelationshipbetwoentax structureand tax compliance.An examinationof the role
that the income tax structureof developingcounties plays in tax compliancemay provide
lessonsthat couldbe appliedto the transporttax structure.
17. A formal model, presented in Annex A, makes several propositionsabout the
deerminantsof tax evasionand tax avoidance. The rate of evasionwill increasewiththe rate
of tax. A greaterprobabilityof detection,a moreseverepenaltyif caught,and the enforcedloss
of benefitsaccruedby claimingtax payment,can reduceevasion. Tax avoidance,on the other
hand, is the legal exploiationof loopholesin the system. Loopholesor exemptionsenablea
taxpayerto reduceliabilityby adjustingthe consumption
or the compositionof receivedincome,
or by makingdifferentinvestmentor productionchoices. A policyto reducetaxavoidancemust
includelowermaginal tax rates,broadertax basesto eliminatepreferentialtreatmentof certain
activities, increased transactioncosts to taxpayerswho use legal loopholes,and stricter
monitoringof questionablecases.
18. Theproblemsofevasionandavoidancemustbe approachedsimultaneously.Otherthings
being equal,a reducdonin the rate of tax evasioncan increasethe rate of tax avoidance,and
vice versa. For example,if theprice of evasionbecomestoo high, taxpayerswill seekother
waysto reducetheirburden. Commensurately,,
in the absenceof tighterenforcement,closing
loopholesto reducetax avoidancewill increasetax evasion.
19. High marginaltax rates increasethe rewards for evasionand avoidance. At lower
marginaltax rates, individualsor businessesare less willingto risk beingcaughtand punished
for tax evasion. Avoidanceat lowerrates may also be less attractive,since there are costs
involvedin usingexemptionsand deductions.For example,timeis neededfor accountantsand
lawyers to prepare the case; there are administrativecosts for changingthe compensation
packageof employeestoward non-taxablefringe benefits; there are transactioncosts for
reallocatingan investmentportfolio;and thereare costs for shiftng productionactivitiesinto
catgories givenpreferentialtax treatent.
20. Thereare two qualifiersto the propositionthat rate reductionwill improvecompliance.
First, the incre in compliancemay not be large without a simultaneousincrease in
enforcement.If an evaderfeelsthereis littleprobabilityof detection,he maynot be drawnin,
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regardless of a rate reduction. An evader might feel that, because of the lower rate, the
governmentwill be even more lax in pursuing evaders. Second, rate reductionshould not imply
any reduction in the provision of public services. Rather, the aim is to reduce rates while
increasing the size of the base. In other words, a revenue neutral adjustment is sought.
Otherwise,rate reduction may be perceived as a reductionin the benefits from taxespaid. Other
things being equal, such a reduction in benefits would increae resistance to paying tax.
21.
The probability of detectionmay be increased in many ways, most of which are within
the capabilitiesof tax administrationsin LDCs. The identificationof a full tax roll is the most
promising. The registrationof all individuals,businesses,and properties subjectto taxationmay
be accomplished by door-to-door surveys, by using third party information (import licenses,
property transfers, utilityconnections, motorvehicle registrations, and manyother sources), and
by integrating all tax records. This requires a unique taxpayer numberingsystem, which many
low-incomecountries do not have.
22.
Detecting under-reportingis as importantas detectingnon-filing. Under-declarationmay
be detected by developinga presumptiveassessmentsystem for the hard-to-taxand for the selfemployed. A strong audit program is another important protection against under-reporting.
Measures for increasing revenue from customs and excise duty include better inspection
procedures and the use of an up-to-date import valuation data system. Underlying these
proposals should be a stronger training program, computerization, and better advancement
possibilities for the tax administrationstaff.
23.
These detection methods will also reduce tax avoidanceas taxpayersnote the increased
probabilitythat border line cases will be rejected. The addedcost of preparing an adequatecase
will also discourage avoidance.
24.
An increase in the use of penalties is essential to reducing evasion. In too many lowincome countries the penalty is nominal, or rarely applied. The interest penalty on the
underpaymentof tax can be below market rates, penalty on under-declarationof importedgoods
is often minimal, and, though property tax delinquency may be penalized with the seizure of
property, this rarely occurs. In some countries court delays create further incentives. The
problem is compoundedwhere tax amnesties are common, or where non-complianceis settled
out of court.
25.
The key to better enforcementis governmentresolve to impose severepenalties on those
who do not pay. In most instances laws are adequate- the problem is with enforcement. One
way to cope with court delays is to make the taxpayer remit the assessed amount pending the
legal decision. Another approach is to publicly announcethe names of delinquents.
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III. ROAD TRANSPORT TAXATION

26. A roadtransporttax has no clear-cutdefinition.If RUT is evaluatedas tax on a sector,
the evaluationmight include whether tax matchesthe benefits from roadwayexpenditure;
whetherrevenuecollectionis in step withgrowthin thepotentialtransporttaxbase;whetherthe
varioustypesof RUTare havingthe desiredallocativeeffects;and whetherthe right RUT "tax
handlesware beingusedto makeadministrationefficientand fair. The followingpagesoutline
the use of each form of transporttax and charge. The discussionfocuseson administrative
procedures,experienceswith evasionand avoidance,RUT revenue- ld and elasticity,the
definitionof rate and base, the revent-esplit betweencentral and local government,and
problemswith the structureand adminisLationof the tax.
Defini Road T_port

Taxation

27.
In the eight case studies on which this paper is based, the scope of transport tax includes
charges related to the ownership and operation of motor vehicles, and charges related to road
use. By this general classification,RUT can be divided into the following categories:
*
*
D
3

motor fuel tax;
excise tax, sales tax, and import duty;
annual licenses and vehicle registration charges;
vehicle tolls and tax on the movementof goods;
income tax on transport-relatedactivities.

28.
Within these categores, many types of levies are used. A road transport study in
Indonesia,prepared by consultantsin 1982, identified22 types of RUT in the revenue structure
(Table 2). Still, ambiguitiespersist about what counts as a tax on the transport sector. For
example, shouldincome tax on companiesinvolved in the productionand sale of motorvehicles
and transport services be included? Some argue that this is a general tax on income earned by
any business meetingthe exemptiontest, and is not specific to any sector. A similar study of
India, prepared as background for this report, does not count company income tax on road
transport operators as a road user charge becauseit "is not a tax levied on inputs or outputs of
die road transport industry". The Indonesia study, by contrast, does count corporate income tax
on importers or domestic assemblers as transport tax.
29.
Some studies view the separation of general taxes from those related to the use of roads
as necessary. The Indonesia study separates transport tax into the broad categoriesof general
revenue taxes and road user charges. The former are levied on the transport sector as part of
national revenue policy, while the latter are differentiallyhigher taxes levied on the transport
sector. For example, the general rate of customs duty on

9

Table 2: Indon:e

(1978)

Motor Vehide Tax Sture

SpecificUser Charge
General

Revenue

TIIofax

Ta

_,.

Variable

Fxed

Admin.Revenue Admin,Revenue

A. Motor Vehiciesand Parts
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

CustomsDuty
Importerscorporatetax
Importsalestax
Manuftcturingsalestax
Dealerscorporatetax
Ownershiptransfertax
vehicletax

x

x
x
x
x
x

x
x
x

x
x

B|. VehidleOprations
1.
2.
3.
4.
S.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Dutyon importedlubricants
Importerscorporatetax on lubs.
Importsalestax on lubs.
Dealerscorporatetaxon lubs.
Salestax on lubricants
Salestax on spareparts
Salestax on tyresand tubes
Driverslicensefees
Taxon fuel
Ruralroad levies
Tol road levies

1.
2.
3.
4.

Weighbridgefees
Vehicleinspectionfees
Paddngfees
Commercialroutelicensefees

x
x
x
x

x
x
x
x
x
x
x

C.
x
x
x
x
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an automobile, or the general rate of value added tax on an automobilepart, comes under the
heading of general revenue tax. Any differentially higher rate of duty or VAT would be
classified as a specific road user charge. Specific road user charges are further subdividedinto
fixed charges, vehicle sales tax, an initial registration fee - or taxes levied periodically, such
as import duty - and taxes that vary with vehicle use, such as fuel tax.
Motor Fuel
30.
Motor fuel tax is the dominant source of revenue from the transport sector. In the
percentage comparisons between developingcountries, it commonly accounts for half of all
transport tax revenue. Percentages for the eight countries studied are:
Argentina (1988)
Bolivia (1988)
Ghana (1988)
Guatemala (1988)
India (1988)
Nepal (1985)
Tanzania (1986)
Yugoslavia(1988)

56 percent
62 percent
90 percent
49 percent
47 percent
37 percent
32 percent
63 percent

The evidencepresented in Table 1 suggeststhat motor fuel tax accounts for about 6 percent, on
average, of total national tax and is equivalent to around 1 percent of GDP. The reliance can
be greater. In Costa Rica, motor fuel tax accounts for more than 16 percent of total national
tax and 3 percent of GDP.
31.
Revenue performance. The potential base of motor fuel taxation is broad enough to
yield significant revenue at modest rates. Yet the ceiling for rates depends on political
constraints and the need to avoid placing an undue tax burden on non-road users of petroleum
products.
32.
The revenueperformanceof a tax might also be evaluatedby its income elasticity,in this
case whether automatic growth in motor fuel revenue is more or less in proportion to GDP.
Most observers believe that revenue from tax on motor fuel is buoyant, that is, it automatically
increases, at least in proportion to GNP. This assumes that the monetary value of petroleum
consumptionover the long-run will increase faster than GNP. However, motor fuel tax is not
always income elastic. For example, income elasticityof motor fuel tax in Guatemalabetween
1984 and 1989 was less than 0.9 percent. In real per capita terms, motor fuel revenue was 30
percent lower in 1989 than 1986. In Jamaica between 1978 and 1983 (Smith, 1984), there was
a decline in the real value of tax on a gallon of gasoline. Why is this? Consider that revenue
income elasticity of motor fuel tax has three components, as described below:
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IdT=.AI* dTB * d
dY

where dT
dY
dTB
dB

dTB

dB

dY

= percentage change in motor fuel tax revenue;
= percentage change in GDP;
= percentage change in the taxable base;
= percentage change in the true market value base;

Buoyancyfrom the first component

[ dTBJ
dT |

is derived from the rate structure of motor fuel

tax. Under a flat rate ad valorem tax, rate elasticitywould be unity. One reason for inelasticity
of motor fuel tax observed in many LDCs, is that a specific (per gallon) tax rate is levied;
hence, periodic discretionaryadjustmentsare required for revenue to keep pace with the rising
price of imported petroleum.y Such adjustmentsare politicaUydifficult, and failure to make
them frequently staUsthe revenue growth of motor vehicle tax. For example, in Yugoslavia,
failingto adequatelyindex the tax rate reduced road user tax revenue by about one-half between
January 1987 and March 1988. This problem has led Yugoslavia, and also Argentina, to adopt
ad valorem tax rates in recent years.
33.

The secondcomponentin this simpleformula

is taxable base elasticity- that

is, the extent to which the taxable value of motor fu consumptionproportionately increases
with the market value of motor fuel consumed. This is, potentially,another source of revenue
inelasticity. In most LDCs, the central governmentfixes gasoline prices, detennining the size
of taxable base elasticity. Taxable base elasticity is less than unity in most LDCs if the
government does not let the taxable price increase with the market price. In Indonesia, for
example, one nationallyowned oil company (Pertamina),is responsible for all production, but
the price of motor fuel is set by Presidental decree. In practice, the gas tax (subsidy) is set by
V

If a specifictx rate (t ents pr
wher dG

- chage

allon)is levied,then revenue from a tax at thepump will inres

in gallonsof consumption

no matterwhatthe valueineas of thepotentialtaxablebase (ftG)
whereP is the pumpprice.
SincetdG < dfG)
|T
averapetaxmrtre

in mostcas, the rate claslicitywillbe less fn unityforanygiven

tG

=
-g-

by tdG
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the difference between the administeredretail price of motor fuel and the production cost. The
same is true in Atgentina, where the government sets the gas tax as the differencebetween the
motor fuel retail price and the retentionprice for the oil company. The central governmentsof
all the countries in this sample, set and regulate the price of fuel.
34.

The third componentof this formula Cdy]

is base elasticityof motor fuel tax- that

value of motor fuel consumedto the percent
is, the ratio of the percent increase in the m
increase in GNP. Two factors effect this component- changes in the market price of motor
fuel, and changes in the amount of fuel consumed. The fall in average fuel consumptionduring
the past 18 years (largely due to fuel economymeasures)has dampenedb. se elasticity.
35.
Economic justifiation. Three justifications are commonlygiven for the heavy use of
motor fuel tax in less developed countries. First is a straightforwardrevenue argument. Fuel
consumption is a large tax base,, is relatively price inelastic in demand, and is easily
administeredat the point of importationor at the refinery. Second is that, since most countries
are oil importers, a high petroleumtax is supportedon balance of payments grounds. Third is
efficiency: Gasoline tax is a rough charge for the use of transport services, especially
highways.1YThe benefits justification contains important weaknesses, which are magnifiedin
LDCs. Despite the rhetoric, in most LDCs the tax on motor fuel is not usually designed as a
benefits levy.
36.

A true benefits levy would approximatethe followingconditions:§'
-

Nonpaymentwould mean exclusion from the benefits of highway services;

*

Consumersof highwayservices would pay according to the benefitsthey derived;

*

Proceeds of the tax/charge would be spent primarily on highway services;

*

Demand for more or less highway service would be expressed through public
willingnessto consume the service at the price set by the authorities.

37.
In LDCs all of these principles are usually violated. First, not all who benefit from the
business use of improvedtransport services share the gas tax burden. Nonpayingbeneficiaries
are those whose business profits, property values, and general quality of life are improvedby

I/

In the UnitedStates, total highway expenditureat all levels of governmentis approximatelyequal to total gsoe
tax collection(Musgrav¢andMusgrave,pp. 230-231).

I/

A thoroughdiscussionis in Shoup,pp. 118-126.
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better access to highway services. Inequityfrom the use of gas tax as a benefits charge occurs
in developing and developed countries alike.
38.
Second, the gasoline tax does not recognize that different users of highway services
impose different costs on the highway system. Among the variables not usually accountedfor
are different speeds of travel, different levels of congestion, different vehicle weights and
different road surfaces. Third, all gasoline tax revenue is not always designated for the road
fund. For example, in Ghana, only about 20 percent of the specific levy on gasoline is
earmarked as a charge for highway services. This implies that the remainder is considered a
general revenue tax and/or a penalty for luxury consumption. Using only part of the gasoline
tax for the road fund suggests in some countries that the tax is levied primarily to conserve'
foreign exchange, or to promote macroeconomic or industrial policy objectives.2' The
relationship between total collection from motor fuel tax and total road expenditure varies
widely, as may be seen from the right column of Table 1. Of the countries surveyed for this
comparison, the median share is about 80 percent.
39.
Finally, the benefits levy is not set by, nor does it signify, demand for more, less or
different transport services. If road users want improved or changed services, they must act
through the political process. If they want lower gasoline prices (the pressure more likely
brought to bear on the politicalprocess), they may threaten to strike, boycott, or even publicly
protest. Despite low levels of automobileownershipand gasoline tax, the public in developing
countries is sensitive to sharp increasesin gasolineprices. The principal users of the transport
system - automobile owners and taxi drivers, mini-van owners, and their customers - are
usually educated and often politicallyvocal and influential (see also Due, 1988, Chapter 4).
40.
The motor fuel tax must serve several functions; policy makers see it as a way to
improve resource allocation, to redress an unequal distributionof income, and to raise revenue.
in most countries fuel tax gives preferential treatment for some activities and penalizes others.
Ease of administrationencouragesreliance on motor fuel tax, but preferential treatmentand the
political problems inherent in raising gasoline tax imposes constraintson its use.
41.
Rate nd base. Motor fuel is taxed in several ways. Imported petroleumis subject to
a customsduty; domesticrefineriesare subjectto an excise tax; the state monopolyon petroleum
products may be taxed retained earnings; a retail sales tax may be imposed on the pump price;
and the pump price may be set above (below), production cost.

V/

Not a*1industrialcountriescannark the gasolinetax for the tmnsporatationservice. Tait and Morgan (1980) note
that of 10 (Organization
for EconomicCooperationand Development(OECD)countries studied, only six devoted
all or part of their excise on petroleumto financinghighways.
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42. Some countriesuse only one of these tax forms and others use a combination. For
example,Boliviataxesdomesticproductionand use of motor fuelthrougha productiontax, a
value-addedtax, a transactiontax, a royalty,and the transferto the governmentof a share of
stateoil monopolyprofits. Indonesianlaw providesfor a 10percentexcisetax and a 10percent
sales tax on motor fuel consumed,but in practiceneitheris levied. Instead,the Indonesian
governmentsets the tax (subsidy)rate as the differentialbetweenproductioncost and retail
pAce.
43. In mostcountries,the taxrate on motorfuelis specificratherthanad valorem. As noted
above, the problemwitha specificrate is that it mustbe indexedto the baseprice to maintain
revenueelasticity.If thisis notdone,the governmentmustmakeperiodic,unpopular,tax hikes.
For countriesderivinggasolinerevenue from a tax rather than from the profits of the state
monopoly,the solutionto the elasticityproblemhasbeenan ad valoremrate. Assessmentunder
a value-basedtax need not be more complicated. Petroleumprices are fixed, and physical
methodsof controlmaybe used, but revenuegrowthbecomesautomatic.
44. Thougha specificrate is stillwidelyused,thereis a trendtowardestablishingad valorem
rate structures. Of the eightcountriescoveredhere, the adoptionof ad valoremin Yugoslavia
and Argentinahas been mentioned;Nepalhas establisheda percentrate salestax on motorfuel
(but not import duty);and Indonesiahas an ad valoremrate in theory, if not practice.
45. Somearguethat withan ad valoremrate structure,revenuefaUswhenpetroleumprices
fall, and inflationis stimulatedwhen petroleumprices rise. The stabilityargumenthas been
proven. However,there is less evidencethat fuel tax increasesdrive up generalconsumer
prices. Hughes(1987),has comparedthe price effectsof revenueneutralincreasesin fueltax
and a generalconsumptiontax in Tunisia,Indonesia,andThailand. His resultsare partlybased
on input-outputtablesfor those countries,takinginto accountdirectand indirecteffects. The
results showthat a generalconsumptiontax leadsto a largerprice rise than doesan equaltax
yield on gasoline. Thus, factorincomeratherthan consumptioncarriesa majorityof the fuel
tax increaseburden. Repeatingthe experimentusingthe variousfuel taxes, Hughesfindsthat
only keroseneyieldsa significantprice effect.
46. Rate structuresin LDCs tendto be differentiatedaccordingto typeof fuelY The usual
practiceignoresroad use efficiencymaintaininga higherpetroltax rate thanthe rate on diesel
fuel(andfuel usedfor non-roadpurposes).Diesel-powered
vehiclestend to be heavier,impose
a greaterroad maintenancecost, and travelgreaterdistancesper gallonof gasline consumed.
This suggeststhat diesel consumersshould carry the greater tax burden. Either way, the
introductionof a differentialrate structureimmediatelycomplicatestax administration. At
ftI

This is differat fiom the practice in most indusrlized countries,whichtax bothat the same nrt. Singapore,
however, has not taxeddie fuelsicer 1979.
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present, it encouragesusers to sw,tch to diesel-drivenvehicles, and opens the door for
unintendedpreferentialtreatment.
47. In the face of these problems,why do governmentsdifferentiatebetweenfuel rates?
Threereasonsare oftencited. Firstconcernsincomedistribution- lowerdieselratessubsidize
publictransportation,whichis mainlyusedby the poor, and highergasolinetax rates are borne
disproportionately
by higherincomepeoplewho are mostlikelyto own and operatevehicles.
Second,the presentsystemleavesprivatetransportationunderpriced.The short run marginal
costs imposed by motor vehicles on roadwaysare not covered by existing user charges.
Therefore,a reductionin the price of public transportationthroughlower dieselcost aims to
keep the relativefuelprices sociallybalanced.
48. The third reasongovernmentsdifferentiateis to give favoredtreatmentto non-transport
diesel(includinghomeheatingfuel)use. The aim is to protectlowincomefamiliesand avoid
compromisingindustrialdevelopment.The counter-argument
is that a blanketsubsidyto diesel
fuel is a subsidyto road haulersand shippers,and to beneficiariesof theseservices. Different
fuel prices also distorttransportationchoicesagainstaltemativessuch as rail, and they may
distortlocationchoicesfor productionfacilitiesby loweringtransportationcosts. Findingan
equitablerate structureis difficult. For example,institutingthe correctpolicyof lowerrates
for off-highwaydiesel use (farming,industry, railroads,electricitygeneration,and so on),
createscomplexadministrative
problems(Due 1988,pp. 78-79).
49. Exemptionsare anotherdeparturefromthebroadbase, flatrate maximthat characterizes
efficienttaxation. No patternor general rule appearsfor motor fuel tax exemptions. For
example, Yugoslaviaexemptsuse by the army, by the marines, and use for agricultural
purposes;Nepalexemptsonlydiplomaticuse; and Ghanaprovidesno exemptions.For the case
studycountries,no data are availableon how muchthe taxbaseis compromised
by exemptions.
50. Inmental
sharing. For many sound reasons, motor fuel tax is levied by
centralgovernmentin mostdevelopingcountries.Gaspricesare politicallysensitiveand motor
fuel taxationis too big a nationalrevenuesource to tum over to local governmentcontrol.
Allowinglocalgovemmentto affectprices,evenat the margin,can be dangerous.If inter-local
variationsin gas prices were largeenough,fuel carryingwouldresult.
51. This said, in some countrieslocal governmentdoes benefitfrom motor fuel tax. In
Argentina,Guatemala,Indonesia,and India,a portionof receiptsis distributedto the stateand
local governmentsectors. Allocationand distributionformulasvary among countries. In
Argentina,an excessprofiton motorfuel is definedas one-halfthedifferencebetweenretention
price and government-defined
market price. The former is roughly a breakevenfigure.
Approximately
9 percentof the excessprofitis distributedto theprovincesas theirshareof the
fuel fund. Guatemalanmunicipalitiesshare 2 centsper gallonof the gasolinetax.
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52.
Some local/provincial governmentsare given power to tax motor fuel and retain the
revenue. In Indonesia, provincial governmentis, in theory, allowed to levy fuel tax, but this
power is not used. Bahl and Linn (forthcoming)surveyed the local government use of motor
fuel tax in the 1970s and 1980s. They found fuel tax was levied by a few large urban
governmentsin LDCs.
53.
A
. A major attraction of motor fuel taxation is ease of administration.
Since there are relatively few distribution points, and few distributors, the liable taxpayer is
easily identified and policed. In Indonesia, for example, the nationally owned oil company
(Pertamina), assesses and collects all domestic tax on motor fuel. The situation is similar in
Nepal. Tax on motor fuel in Ghana is paid by a small number of distributors. The tax is based
on their supply from the National Petroleum Company, which is the sole importer. In
Yugoslavia, the tax is administered by a few petrol companies, that own and operate petrol
'tations. Input and output prices remain centrally determined. Fuel price is centrally regulated
in Indch, where the government collects the tax at its source as part of import or ex-factory
prices. Siace input and output prices are usually fixed, collectioncost is borne by distributors
or factories. As the compliancecontrols are straightforward,collection cost is not high. Due
(1988, p. 79), notes that inspectorsat refineries are not necessary. In Bolivia, collection cost
is estimated to be less than 1 percent of collected fuel tax revenue.
54.
Evasion. avoidance and revenue potential. Problems with evasion or avoidance of
motor fuel tax in the eight sample countries are rare - all report a collection rate of 100
percent.2 ' But a 100 percent collection rate means only that the total billed amount is collected.
This implies that as far as tax collection is concerned, evasion is not a problem. Neither is
assessment a problem, since taxpayers and petroleum suppliers are easily identified, and
assessmentmethods are straightforward.
55.
The bigger issues in transport tax administrationare whether the fuel tax base is assessed
fully and whether legal tax avoidanceoccurs. The evasionof motor fuel tax through smuggling
is discussed later.
56.
The first gap between revenue potential and revenue collection lies within the legal
definitionof the tax base, that is, the level at which marketprice is defined. Among LDCs, any
commonalityof practice in fuel pricing is the placement of diesel and kerosene below border
prices and the placement of gasoline at a higher level. One recent World Bank study in
Tanzania estimates that, on average, diesel and kerosene are set at 25 to 40 percent below
internationalborder prices, and that gasoline, on average, is set at 50 percent above. The ideal

2/

An inteeting exception
is Chad wherethe governmentfailedto pay for its deliveriesand the oil companies
respondedby withholdingtheir tax payments.
4
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is a motor fuel tax with a large enough yield to cover state monopolylosses and contribute to
the general budget or to transportationnetwork financing.
When the net-of-tax economicprice for fuel is above the net-of-tax administeredprice,
57.
the financial tax levied may be partially or fully offset by subsidy. The result may be a net
transport sector subsidy, rather than a road use tax. In Indonesia, a 9 percent subsidyto petrol
and a 67 percent subsidy to diesel were only partially offset by gas tax and led to real revenue
loss from motor fuel taxation. In Ghana too, all categoriesof fuel appear to be subsidized. This
results in motor fuel taxation far below its economic potential in most LDCs. This taxation
dilemma is part of what led governmentsto subsidizegasoline prices.0
Tax avoidanceis the other cause for fuel tax falling short of revenue potential. The tax
58.
structure allows users to reduce motor fuel tax liability by altering business practices; for
example, claiming exemption, or using cheaper fuel or different transportation modes. Fuel
carrying is another example. By driving to a rural area, motor fuel may be purchased cheaper.
There is no evidence of rural-urban fuel carrying in the cases examined here. Bahl and Linn
(forthcoming),argue that the high cost and low return on fuel carrying make differentiallyhigher
urban fuel prices quite feasible. Other ways of avoiding paying higher motor fuel tax such as
purchasing small vehicles, and making greater use of public transportation,are thoughtto be in
the government's interest.
Somefeatures of the motor fuel tax in LDCs provideincentivefor evasion. Complicated
59.
administrationincreases evaders' probability of success. For example, exemption for certain
classes of fuel users encourages reclassifyingactivities to exempt categories. In Yugoslavia,
anry, marine, agricultural, and pizblicbus operators are partally, totally, or fully exempt from
fuel tax. By comparison with fully taxed use of fuel, marine use is 47 percent cheaper,
agricultural use is 40 percent cheaper, and bus use is 39 percent cheaper. The incentivefor
illegally classifying other private sector activities as exempt, or engaging in some form of
transfer pricing, is strong. However, in Yugoslavia,it is argued that little or no evasionoccurs
because the penalties are said to be severe enough to be an effective deterrent.
Differentialprices for diesel, kerosene, premiumand regular gasoline, open another door
60.
for evasion. The differentialsare often large, incitingpetroleum adulteration. One approach
for dealing with this problem, taken by the governmentof Ghana, imposesa differentiallyhigher
excise on regular gasoline to equalizewholesaleprices. Other, more administrativeapproaches
are coloring types of fuel for easier identification, using additives to discourage improper
blending, or restricting the quantitysold at any one time.

IQ/

Low fuel prices also give rise to other problems. For example,in Tanzania the combinationof a low fuel price
and a low margin to cover transport cost discouragesthe haulingof fuel to inlandlocations.
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61. Smugglingdue to fuelpricedifferentialsbetweencountriesis anotherproblem.Theprice
of gasolinein Tanzaniais wellbelowthat of neighboringKenya. Fuelis smuggledbetweenthe
two. Theproblemin Tanzaniawas complicatedin 1987by an overvaluedexchangerate. As
one WorldBank studynoted,"...fuel is importedinto Tanzania,jaid for in foreigncurrency,
and then resoldover the border for local currency." Thecost to the Tanzaniangovernmentis
a revenueloss, assumingthat motorfuel is set belowmarketprice. Fuel prices in Ghanaare
also relativelylow. This leadsto fuel carryingfrom Ghanato neighboringIvory Coast. It is
estimatedthat suchleakageis around 1 percentof totaldomesticsaleswitha concentrationon
kerosene. Thus, rather than undercollectingthe Govemnmentof Ghana is modestly
overcollecting.However,withGhana'sex-refinerypriceswellbelowworldprices,it is doubtful
if the tax revenuecollectedon illegallyexportedfuels compensatesfor the subsidylost.
PurchaseTaxation: Duty and Sales Tax
62. Tax on the saleand purchaseof motorvehiclesand partsare collectedin four different
forms: import duty, general sales tax, excise on domesticproduction,and incometax on
manufacturersand dealers. Thoughthe motorvehicleshareof thesetax basesis significant,it
may not be meetingfull revenue potential. To determinethe extent of revenuepotential
reached,the tax basedefinitionsand rate structuresin variouscountriesmustbe reviewedand
matchedagainstmodemnormsfor a good tax. An evaluationof administrativepractice,and
an explorationof divisionsof responsibilityfor these taxes among central and subnational
governmentsis also required. Lastly,we take up the reductionof avoidanceand evasion.
63. Revenueimportance.Therevenueimportanceof salesand productiontaxes,as a share
of GNP and as a share of total transporttax, is describedfor a small sampleof countriesin
Table3. Basedon this small sample,one-thirdof all revenuecollectedfrom transportation
activityseemsa feasiblelevel.
Table3: RevenuefromCustomsDuty,SalesTaxesand Excises
Country
1. Argentina

1987

2.
3.
4.
5.

0.7

1985
1986
1988
1988

22.4

0.3
1.1
0.4
0.6

1980

33.7
64.6
19.2
32.2

0.4

1984

1.0

n.a.

Nepal
Tanzania
India
Guatemala

6. Indonesia

7. Jamaica
64.

on Motor Vehiclesand Motor VehicleParts
Percent
Percent of Total
Year
of GDP
Transport Taxes

33.0

Revenue from these taxesis rarely earmarkedfor expenditureon transportationservices.

The evaluationof practicesin this area centerson the contributionof these transporttaxes to
generalrevenue,and to increasingtheir contributionthroughimprovedadministration.
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d rate struCau. Thereare three pointsat whichthe value of motorvehicles
and motor vehicleparts can be taxed: at point of sale, at point of import, and at point of
manufacture. Nearly all countriesmake use of all three stages. Beyondthis, however,it is
difficultto describea commonpatternfor taxingthepurchaseandproductionof motorvehicles
and parts. Every countrydevelopsan approachconsistentwith its economicgoals, with its
existingtax structure,withits foreignexchangeposition,withthe skillsof its tax administration,
and with the degreeto whichit is tryingto protectdomesticmanufactureor assemblyof motor
vehicles. The degreeof rate and basevariationsis evidentfroma summaryreviewof practices
followedin severalof the case studycountries. Indonesiatakesthe broadestapproach,levying
the followingtaxeson the purchaseand productionof motorvehicles:
Ba_e

*
*
*
*
*
*

customsduty;
incometax on importers;
salestax on imports;
manufacturer'ssalestax;
incometax on dealers;
owner-hiptransfertax.

Indonesiaalso may tax the narrowestbasein that manymotorvehiclepurchasesare subjectto
preferentialtreatment. Most importandy,all commercialvehicles (all pickups) and all
govemmentpurchasesare exemptfrom salestax and from customsduty. Parts importedfor
assembly(completelyknocked down units) also are exemptfrom customsduty. The rate
suctures for customsduty and for sales tax are complicated,but generallyfavorableto the
tansportsector. Completelyknockeddownunitsare givena preferentialsales tax rate. The
highestrate is leviedon completelybuilt-upunits- twicethe rate on unassembledunits.
65. Indiausesa combinationof exciseduty,salestax, andcustomsdutyto tax theproduction
and purchaseof motor vehiclesand motor vehicle parts. The Indian systemis the most
complicatedof thoseconsidered. The entralgovernmentleviescustomsdutyon all imported
vehiclesand parts, and leviesexcisedutyon the domesticmanufactureof motorvehiclesand
parts. A creditis allowedvehiclemanufacturers
for certaintaxespaid on inputs- exciseduty,
specialexciseduty, and additionalcustomsduty. Thereare severalrestrictionson the use of
this credit. For example,creditis validfor a manufacturingsite ratherthan for a firm, and the
inputsmustbe includedin an identifiableoutputunit. Thisinvolvescomplicatedrecordkeeping
and classification.The rates of customsduty andexcisedutyvaryaccordingto the component
beingimportedor produced,with the highestrate for imported,assembledvehicles.
66. Salestax in Indiais leviedat the wholesaleand/orretaillevelby stategovernmentsand
centralgovernment.Stategovernmentsmay set theirown salestax rate, restrictedonly in that
(1) the tax rate may not exceed4 percenton interstatetransactions,and (2) the tax may not
discdminateagainstgoodsproducedoutsidethe state. Commodities
are the tax base and most
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services (includingtransport), are exempt. Central sales tax is leviedon interstatetrade at a rate
of 4 percent, or at the level applied in the state where the sale takes place, whichever rate is
lowest.
67.
Three taxes are levied on vehicles and parts purchases in Tanzania. In theory, import
duty is payable on all motor vehicles,but discretionaryrelief is granted. The result is that about
half the tax due on imports is collected. The rate structure varies, dependingon the import, but
the duty is 100 percent for vehicles with large engines. Sales tax, collectedat the import stage,
has the same rate as customs duty, except for the tax on spare parts, which is twice the customs
duty rate. Sales tax on vehicle transfers is based on a schedule, with rate graduated according
to vehicle age, weight, and engine size.
68.
Nepal derives about one-thirdof its tax on the transport sector from motor vehicles and
parts. Three levies are involved: sales tax, importduty, and import license tax. Customs duty
is levied on vehicles, spare parts, and tires at a high rate relative to the other samplecountries
- except for imports from India, which are taxed at a lower rate. Also, for qualifiedimports,
Indian excise duty legally may be refunded. Import license fees are sold at three rates: 5 percent
of cost, insurance, and freight (c.i.f.) value (trucksand buses), 10 percent of c.i.f. value (eeps
and motorcycles),and 25 percent of c.i.f. value (automobiles). Vehicles and parts purchased
by government or by privileged educational and social organizationsare exempt from duty,
license fee, and sales tax. Sales tax base is the sum of c.i.f. value, customsduty, and a markup
on c.i.f. plus customs. For most vehicles the markup is 100 percent, for Indian imports it is 15
percent, and for governmentand governmentcorporations, there is no markup. Sales tax rate
varies from 20 percent on cars to 15percent on trucks and buses, and to 10 percent on tires and
spare parts.
69.
In Ghana, taxation on motor vehicle purchases is light, and in recent years import duty
has been reduced or abolished. There is no duty on trucks, buses, small-engine cars, or
commercial vehicles. Large-engine cars are subject to a 15 percent or 25 percent rate,
dependingon engine size. Spare parts are subjectto a 10 percent rate. All vehicles more than
five years old are subject to import duty at ascending rates reaching 100 percent for vehicles
more than 10 years old. Import duty rates on vehicles are in line with those levied on other
imported commodities. Vehicles or parts subject to import duty are also subject to a sales tax
of 10 percent of c.i.f. value (or selling price, if domesticallyproduced).
70.
In Yugos!avia,the main objectiveof importduty is to protect domesticindustry. Import
duty rates range between 25 percent for automobilesand 20 percent for buses, trucks, parts, and
tires. An equalizationtax of 10 percent and a special tax of 4.8 percent are additionallyapplied
to duty-paid value. Sales tax is levied at the retail level, except for direct sales from
manufacturers,with whom liability for collection resides. Sales to commercialenterprises are
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exempt. There are separate sales tax levies at federal, state, and local levels. The federal rate
is 15 percent on vehicles and 17 percent on spare parts. The state rate varies widely.
six taxes are levied on the production or purchase of new vehicles. The
In ArgenDtina,
71.
rates are high relative to the other sample countries. The structure of customs duty is driven
more by import control than by revenue-raising. The import duty rate ranges from 20 percent
to 55 percent for most products, with motor vehicles at the top of this range. In additionto
customsduty, all importspay a statisticalcharge (3 percent of customsvaluation),and an export
promotion tax (0.5 percent of customsvaluation). The Argentineanvalue-added tax is levied
at a basic rate of 15 percent. In addition,there are special taxes on the purchase and production
of new cars. The excise tax rate varies with fuel consumption,but between 4 and 8 percent of
list price. The highest rate on domesticallyproduced automobilesis 12 percent. All imports
must pay a rate of 21 percent of list price. The National Highway Fund also earmarks a tax
equivalent to 7 percent of purchase price. Tires are subject to three sales taxes, with a
consolidatedrate of 27 percent of retail price. There is no central tax on used car sales.
About 20 percent of Bolivia's import duty in 1987was attributableto motor vehiclesand
72.
spare parts. In recent years, the number and type of imported vehicles and the effectivenessof
customsadministrationvaried widely. Hence, revenue yield has been volatile. Value-addedtax
is charged on all new car sales, and accounts for about 5 percent of total VAT collection. A
uniform VAT rate of 10 percent applies to all sales through the retail level (for covered firms).
A transactiontax of 1 percent of the value of every commercialtransactionalso is levied on new
car sales and transfers. Finally, before a new vehicle may be registered, municipalitiescharge
a fee equivalentto 5 percent of assessed import value.
_g. For most countries,vehicle purchaseand productiontaxes
etals
Itor
73.
are levied by central government. Except in large federations, import and excise duties and
general sales tax are usually reserved for the central government. Still, local governmentsdo
benefit from special levies, from the property transfer tax, from shares of central taxes, and
from vehicle purchase and production taxes.
The Indian federation is a case where state and local governmentare heavily involved
74.
in vehicle purchase taxation. Approximately25 percent of total purchasetax is collecteddirectly
by state govemnmentin the form of sales tax. As noted above, states may set general sales tax
rates (which also apply to motor vehicles), subject only to the constraints that they do not
discriminateagainst interstate trade, and do not exceed the 4 percent federal rate on interstate
transactions. Liability for tax paymentis with the seller; hence states must register all dealers,
oversee necessary recordkeeping, and be responsiblefor assessmentand collection.
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75. Yugoslaviagives its provincialand local governmentsconsiderablerevenue-raising
latitude. Thereare sepamtesalestax rates for central,stateand localgovernment,with some
staterates higherthan thoseleviedat the center.
76. Bolivianmunicipalities
imposea fee equivalentto 5 percentof assessedimportvaluefor
registrationof any newcar. Theyalso receivea 10percentshareof the nationalgovernment's
1percenttransactiontax.: Loal governmentin Argentinagaveup its claimon independent
local
taxdngpowers in exchangefor a share in centralrevenue. However,muricipalitiesmay still
levy a transfertax on the saleof usedcars. Provincialgovernmentin Indonesiaalso leviesa
tax on the transferof motorvehicleownership.The transferof ownershipyieldedless than 3
percentof totalprovincialgovernmentrevenuein 1982. Sincethe tax rate is high -5 percent
on ordinaryvehiclesand 10percenton luxuryvehicles- this is surprising. Newcar purchases
are includedin the base.
77. The local govemnn
ents of Tanzaniaand Ghanaplay a minimalrole in transportsector
taxation.Localgovernmentparticipationin mostdevelopingcountriesconsistslargelyof annual
licenses,registration,and toll charges.
78. Eujgoynavoda= and revenuepoteial. Vehiclepurchasetax is lesseasilycollected
and enforcedthan is tax on motor fuel. This situationis caused by a greater numberof
coletion points, a greater need for active enforcementof the tax, and a greater need for
discretionin establishingthe taxablebase. Unfortunately,no detaileddata exist for a studyof
eachcountry'sabilityto collectpotentialrevenuefrom vehiclepurchasetax. The casestudies
do makeit possibleto understandwhy tax evasionand tax avoidanceoccur, and clarifywhich
stepswill bring revenuefrompurchasetax closer to its potential.
79. Avoidanceof vehiclepurchasetaxoccursfor two reasons. First, a highenoughtax rate
gives the seller/purchaseran incentiveto escapea portionof the tax; the savingsare worththe
cost of the adjustment. A dangerously prohibitivelytax rate (cowmbined
with weak
administration),is reported for Tanzania. High import duty and sales tax rates on motor
vehiclesencouragemoreapplicationsfor discretionaryexemptionor preferentialtreatment,and
incrsed evasion. The result,describedin Figure 1, is that the amountof dutycollectedfalls
as the duty rate increases. Thoughno other factors are taken into account,the results are
striling. For example,when duty payableis 20 percent,duty collectedaveragesabout 40
percentof payable. Whenduty payableis raisedto 80 percent,duty collectedfails to only 13
percent. Thus, a lower tax rate couldactuallyincreaserevenuecollection.
80. The second reason for avoidanceis a tax structure complicatedwith loopholesor
ambiguities. Taxpayerslook for an opportmityto shift their purchaseor productionto an
exemptactivityor to one subjectto a lowertax rate. Importdutyon motorvehiclesin Ghana
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is a case in point. All cars witha capacityless than 1600cubiccentimeters(if petroldriven),
and less than 1800cubiccentimeters(if dieseldriven),are exempt. Becausethe duty rate on
non-exemptvehiclesis high, importersfrequentlymis-declarecubic capacity. Anotherpoint
where flawsin the tax structureopen the door for tax avoidanceand evasionis the statesales
tax in India. The tax rate is highand the systemis complicated.Two examplesillustratethe
problem:
*

State sales tax rates are generallyhigherthan the centralsales tax rate. In an
interstatesale, the selleris subjectto the centralrateonly. Whenthe sametrader
or manufacturertransfersgoodsto anothersite, thereis no tax, even if the other
site is in a differentstate. Buyers and sellers take full advantageof this,
frequentlyarrangingpurchasesfromout-of-statevendorsandverticallyintegrating
activities.

-

To eliminatedoubletaxation,the governmentprovidescredit for tax paid on
certaininputsagainsttax paidon totaloutput. However,determiningwhichtaxes
may be creditedis complicatedand involvesan extensiverecordkeepingsystem.
Further,the systemcontainsambiguities.For example,somedutiesare variable
dependingon the finaluse of the inputin production;hence,the amountof credit
is uncertain. Out of suchcomplicationscomevariousformsof transferpricing
to reduceoveralltax liability.

81. The chiefavenuefor avoidanceis exemption. It is estimatedthat the collectionrateW
on import duty in Tanzaniais onlyabout45 percent- not accountingfor evasion. Aboutonethird of this shortfallis due to discretionaryexemption. In Indonesia,where there are many
exemptionsfor varioustypesof motorvehicles,only about75 percentofpotentialtax revenue
is collected.

82. The determinantsfor tax evasion overlap with those for tax avoidance. Unlike
avoidance,however,evasionis the illegalresultof taxpayersfailingto file, underdeclaringtax
liability,or failingto remittaxesthat are due. Severalcharacteristicsmakea tax regimeprone
to a high rate of evasion:
*
*
*
*
*

wI

A high tax rate (andperhapshighcompliancecost);
A poor or corruptadministration,where detectionis unlikely;
A complicatedtax structureand ambiguoustax legislation;
A low penaltyrate for non-compliance;
A governmentunwillingto enforcethe tax and stringentlyapplythe penalties;

Mem
oolon

rate is definedas the ratioof collction to the fullvalueof impoitedmotorvehicles.
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A historyof frequentamnesties.
This list describesthe tax systemof manydevelopingcountries,and the dynamicsof vehicle
purchasetaxationin someof the case studies.
83. Customsadministrationproblemscan be traced to four root causes, all of which
contributeto the failure to realizefull revenuepotentialfrom importduty on motor vehicles.
First is misclassification
to evadeimport duty. Undercomplicatedtariff structures,customs
officersare responsiblefor makingclassificationdecisions.This systemmay resultin different
rates of duty. The taxpayer'sincentiveto mis-reportcontents,and the difficultyin detecting
misreportingincreasewith the degreeof rate differentiation.
84. Second,staffare not fully trained,do not useproper procedures,and oftenundervalue
imports. This form of evasionis highlysuccessful,sincecustomsinspectorsin developing
countriesmustrelyon invoicereviewsand availableinformationon currentmarketvalues. The
lack of officer training in import valuationand the lack of up-to-datevaluationinformation
meansundervaluation
is likelyto remainan importantsourceof importdutyevasion. Adequate
staff and properprocedurescouldbetterpoliceanotherform of evasion: the importationof a
vehicleon a temporarybasis, with intentto keep it in the countryindefinitely. This form of
evasionis most easilyaccomplishedwherethereare entrypoints by land.
85. Third, customsadministrationis often corrupt.1 Smugglingmay offer a return of
more than 100 percent, especiallywith little probabilityof detection. The probabilityof
detectioncan be loweredwith the collaborationof customsofficials- they may be easily
enlistedif their salariesare low. Smugglingis also aided by the often lax physicalcontrolof
goodsthroughcustoms.
86. Collectionrate on excisefrom domesticallyproducedautomobilesis high due in part to
the physicalcontrol of goods at the manufacturingsite. The evasionof sales tax is more
problematic.Sincea substantialportionof salestax is collectedat the importlevel,evasionof
importdutyis compoundedwithlike evasionof salestax. Thereare manywaysthat domestic
traders(especiallyin parts and tires), mightevadegeneralsales tax. Tait (1988,chapter 14),
lists the more commonapproachesas: failure to register, underreportedsales, exaggerated
refundclaims,unrecordedcashpurchases,and claim;nigineligiblecredits.

IV

Due,1988,p. 51, aW probknuof customs
cormption."Customs
workis morevulnemabl
to briey hn most
othertypc of taxcollection.IThe a frequentchanco fordifferencesof opinion,andthereis closecontao
betweenthe importer(or hi broker)and customspronnd. Theimportercannotobtainhi goodsuntilthe
assesed
dutyis paid;the officeris therfore in a positionto seeka bribe,andthe importermayrerd the bribe
ascheaperthanhigherdutiesandpenaliesandeadless
delay..."
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87. The state sales tax in India preents an especiallydifficultproblem, becauseproper
enforcementrequiresinterstatecooperation.Somefirms falselydeclaretheirsalesas interstate
to avoidstatesalestax - an easyevasiontechnique,sinceofficialshave no physicalproof that
goods did not pass out of the state. An attemptat controlrequires the importerto hold a
license,issuedby his homestate, if makdngan interstatepurchase. However,verificationof a
licensedimporterrequiresthe cooperationof the importingstate, whichstandsneitherto gain
nor to lose revenuesince liabilityis with the seller. The result is rampantevasion. A 1981
evaluationof the Bihar salestax systemby the NationalInstituteof PublicFinanceand Policy
foundthatin mostyearsrevenuecollectionfom motorparts wasless thanhalf of the estimated
tax potential(as reportedby Acharya,1985). A morerecentstudyof the sales tax collection
rate in all of Indiashowsa lowerrate of revenuerealizationfor stategovenment tax than for
centralgovernmenttax (Governmentof India, 1989,ChapterIV). Thetax recoveryrates from
this study, shown below, define leakagesfrom full taxationas the sum of exemptionsand
evasion:
T|BMy
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88. Vehiclepurchasetax in Argentinais redativelysimpleand claimsa low rate of evasion.
The mainleakageon the new vehicletax is in the area of concessionary
salesby manufacturers.
Otherwise,the taxis collectedwithrelativeeasefroma smallnumberof manufacturers/dealers.
Thereis someevasionin the saleof sparepartsbecausemoreestablishments
are involved. The
total revenueloss due to evasionof the purchasetax on motor vehiclesand parts is estimated
at about 10percentof tax collection.
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he Annual License and Motor VehieleReisration Charei
89. In mostcountries,motorvehiclesmustbe registeredwhenfirst purchased,and they are
subjectto an annualtax.W The latter usuallytakes the form of a license,thoughin Bolivia
(among the countries in this sample), a property tax is levied on the assessedvalue of
automobiles.l' Revenuefrom registrationand from the annual tax on motorvehiclesvaries
frominsignificantin mostof the countriesstudied,to aboutone-fifthof transportsectr revenue
in India (see Table4). However,the annuallicenseis aften assignedto local governmentfor
whomit may be a significantrevenuesource. For example,in Indonesia,
Table 4: RevenueYieldfrom Registrationand AnnualTaxes
on Motor Vehicles

Percent
of GDP

Percent of Total

Coun

rn

1. Argentina
2. Ghana
3. Guatemala

1987
1987
1988

4. India

1988

0.4

19.0

S. Indonesia
6. Jamaica
7. Nepal

1980
1984
1985

'0.1
0.3
0.1

n.a.
1.1
6.7

B. Tanzania

1986

0.2

9.2

0.1
0.0
0.1

TransportTax
4.9
4.32
6.5

the annuallicenseaccountsfor 20 percentof all localgovernmenttransporttax revenue(which
itself accountsfor nearly half of all the revenueraisedby local government).The automatic
revenue-income
elasticityof theannualvehicletaxdependson baseelasticity- whethervehicle
numbers grow faster than GNP - and on the administration'sability to register vehicles.
Automaticrevenue- elasticityof GNP (E) l/n is the ratioof the percentchangein revenue(net
J2/

It is apprepriaeto consderregistrationfe and annudtax together.The enforcement
of the annualtax is very
muchdependeton rcgiston saics, and th adminitaton of each(andperhapsof hetax onthe Urnsfr of
usedvehicle) oftenoverlaps.The regisation fee alsomaybe considereda copilized formof to annul tax.
As notedbelow,Indit is consideringconvetng its annualtax to a onete payment.

ly

Peonal propertytax is not an uncommon
practicein indusial countries.For exaiiple,it is leviedin sveral
AmericanStae.
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of any discretionaryactions), to the percent change in GNP. Since motor vehicles are subject
to annual tax on a specific rate tasis, the rate elasticity (E,) is the ratio of the percent change
in revenue (R) to the percent change in vehicles (V) numbers. A rate elasticity greater than
unity means there is faster growth in vehicles subject to a higher tax rate. The base elasticity
(Eb) is the ratio of the percent change in vehicle numbers to the percent change in GNP. The
total elasticity is the product,
E =

) (EJ.

90.
Expectationsthat base elasticitymight be a source of revenue growth are supportedby
little evidence. A recent review of motor vehicle demand in Guatemalareports that it is highly
income elastic, increasing at a substantiallymore rapid rate than GNP. Rate elasticity, as
defined here, will be unity if tax rate is stated in specific terms, or about unity if rate
differentialsare small, or if all vehicle classes are growing at about the same rate.
91.
In practice, revenue growth seems to be dependent on discretionary change in the tax
rates, but evidence on the effectivenessof tax rate increasesis mixed. In Ghana, it is reported
that after a sharp increase in the annual license fee, the collection rate dropped by 40 percent.
On the other hand, in the Yugoslavianrepublics, the license fee has been raised six or eight
times since 1986 with no fear of reducing collection efficiency.
92.
Though the registration fee producesrevenue for some local governments,it is primarily
a regulatory instrunent. The registration fee facilitates the yearly inspection of vehicles for
safetyand/or insurancecoverage, as a record of the growthin vehicle numbers it also facilitates
road planning and vehicle control. Registrationfee administrationis usually separate from that
of the annual license, and is often a responsibilityof the police (as in Ghana).
93.
Rate. base and administration. The annual license tax is complicatedand difficult to
administer. It reaches a broad and growingbase, but usually with a very low specific rate, and
minimal revenue yield. As is the case with other taxes, recordkeepingfor the annual license is
usually poor; enforcement of the tax is weak, and penalties for non-complianceare low; and
enforcementcosts are high. The chief virtue of the annual license tax as a revenue instrument
seems to be its wide availability - an important characteristic for financially strapped local
governments.
94.
In India, thougb the annuallicense tax is generallygoverned by a federal act, rate setting
and administrationare left to the states. The result is great variation in rates and in choice of
a base. State governmentstax vehicles according to weight, to flat rates, to engine capacity, to
carrying capacity, to types of tires, to whether or not they are diesel-driven, or to some
combinationof these. There are also state registrations(valid forever, even if state of residence
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or business location changes), driver's licenses, changeof ownershipfees, an annual city wheel
tax, and national permits for interstate trade.
95.
For enforcement, India's state governmentsuse mobile squads with the power to stop
vehicles and inspect documents. These squads may levy fines, and in some cases suspend
registration and permits. Yet, the evasionrate is high. It is estimatedthat 30 to 40 percent of
private vehicles and two-wheelersdo not pay. Reasons for non-paymentare a low fine, a high
compliance cost, and a low probability of detection. Conversely, only about 2 percent of
commercial vchicles are thought to be delinquent, in part because of a heavier fine and more
frequent roadside checks.
96.
A similar situation holds for the provincial and the municipal annual license tax in
Argentina. Here it is estimated that about 30 percent of all vehicles are unlicensed and up to
60 percent of the annual license tax is evaded. The reasons are similar to those cited for India.
Compliancecost is high in that all documentationregarding ownershipand registration must be
in order before payment of the annual tax may be made. Moreover, enforcementis sporadic.
If evasion is detected, individuals may make retroactive payment and some consideration
paymentto the detectingauthorities. There is no penalty for failing to register a vehicle. The
issue of high compliancecost also arises in Nepal, where it is estimated that total cost to payers
is equal to about 6 percent of the annual revenue collected (Louis Berger, 1987, p. 46). In
Bolivia, it is estimatedthat about 20 separate transactionsare necessary to register a vehicle a prerequisite for the annual license. The annual vehicle capital tax has a collection cost equal
to 5 percent of revenue collected and a collection efficiencyof only 60 percent.
The license tax paymentratio in Nepal is 65 percent for cars, 55 percent for trucks, and
97.
80 percent for buses. The budget of the annual license divisionin Ghanais equal to 12 percent
of revenue collected from the annual tax, but evasion is equal to more than one-third of
collection. The tax is simple - it is levied at a flat rate - but enforcementis lax.
98.
Yugoslavia is a special case. The annual license tax is levied separatelyand at widely
differentrates, by three levels of government. There is relativelylittle effectiverecordkeeping.
Yet authorities report (but cannot statisticallyverify) no evasion, asserting that enforcementis
sufficient. Police involvement means a high probability of detection and a severe penalty.
However, avoidanceis reported: some individualspurchase their licenses in other republicsor
municipalitiesto avoid a high tax at home.

Tax on the Movementof Goodsand Passengers
Taxes on the movementof goods and passengerscan generate significantrevenue. The
99.
most important is octroi, a tax levied on goods entering a city for local processing or final
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consumption.A Octroiis foundin manyof the localjurisdictionsin India, Pakistan,Nepal,
and until 1981,Bangladesh.In Calcuttathe octroiwasintroducedby the stategovernmentfor
the entire metropolitanarea, with its revenueto be sharedamongthe variouslocalbodiesand
the CalcuttaMetropolitanDevelopmentAuthority. Despitethe revenuesuccessenjoyedby
octroi in India and Pakistan,there are strong movementsto abolishit. The Indianstatesof
Gujarat, Karnataka, and Madhya Pradesh, have abolishedoctroi. Further, it has been
condemnedregularlyby analystsof localgovernmentfinance,includingnumerouscommissions
establishedby the Governmentof India (Bahland Linn, forthcoming,Chapter8). A major
problemis thatoctroimaygreatlyincreasetransporttimeand costs,and maythereforeincrease
the priceof importedgoods. Themagnitudeof timelost is exemplifiedby the MysoreTaxation
Enquiryestimatethat "betweenBangaloreand Mangalore,about800 km, a vehiclehas to stop
for 36 hoursand 40 minutesat checkposts."
100. The octroi base is the value, the weight, or the number of items enteringa local
jurisdiction.In Bombay,the taxis imposedaccordingto valuefor somecommodities,according
to weightfor others,and on a specificbasisfor oil enteringthe city via a pipeline. In Karachi,
enteringby road, but accordingto value
the taxis imposedaccordingto weightfor commodities
for commoditiesenteringvia the city'sport. Ratesvaryaccordingto complicatedschedules,and
some goods and commoditiesin transitare exempt. The tax is collectedby clerks at octroi
stations:Theseare locatedat checkpointson roadsatjurisdictionalborders,at railroadstations,
at airports,and at docks. In Ahmadabad,India(a city of over 2 million),there were 34 octroi
stationsin the 1970s- 18 rail checkpoints,15 road checkpoints,and 1 air checkpoint.There
is usuallyno assessmentproblemwhenthe levy is specific;however,an invoiceis required.
invoiced
Ahmadabadassessorsare equippedwitha manualof marketvaluesfor double-checking
amounts(Bahland Linn, forthcoming).
101. Otherproblemswith the octroi, suchas spoilageof merchandiseand briberyof octroi
staff,occurfrequently.Nanjundappa(1973)estimatedthatin Indiadelaysto vehiclesat border
crossingsreducedannualvehicleutilizationand increasedvariablevehicleoperatingcosts by
approximately25 percent. Not all of this cost can be directlyascribedto octroi, but the
magnitudeof the figure indicatesa considerableloss in efficiency.
102. Octroi therefore gives locally produced commoditiesa pricing advantage over
commoditiesimportedfrom outside the metropolitanarea. Octroi may curtail even intrametropolitantrade if a metropolitanarea has grown beyond the boundariesof the taxing
jurisdiction. As a final irony, the tax can provide a cogent disincentivefor metropolitan
integrationunderan area-wideauthority- consolidationof fragmentedlocalauthoritieswould

&I

Pats of the diion

on octroi is takenfiom Roy Bahl andJohannesLinn, UrbanPublic Funanceand

(forthcoming).
Countries,
in Doveloning
Administraton
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automatically
reducetheoctroitaxbaseby detaxingintra-metropolitan
commodityflows. From
the standpointof efficiency,octroiis an unmitigatedC.saster.
103. In termsof tax equity,the situationis morecomplicatedand dependson localpractice.
In the citiesof Pakistan,attemptshavebeen madeto structurethe tax so that it falls heavilyon
luxury itemsrather thanon foodand other essentials. In Ahmadabadand Bombay,wherethe
rate structurewas less progressive,octroiwas probablymoreregressivethan state salestax.
104. In view of its manyproblems- high administrationcost; considerableroad transport
delays;unknown,but probablypoor collectionefficiency;and collectionmethodsthat invite
corruption- why does octroicontinueto be usedby local governmentin SouthAsia? First,
octroican producesubstantiallocal governmentrevenue. In manyIndianand Paldstanicities,
it dominatesthe revenuestructure. For example,in 1986octroiaccountedfor 80 percentof
totaltax in Karachiandwas 70 percentof totaltax in Ahmadabadin 1984. In aggregate,octroi
still accountsfor morethan one-thirdof all localgovernmentrevenuein India.
105. Octroiis also a highlybuoyantrevenuesource. Between1979and 1986,octroirevenue
in Karachiincreasedby 239 percentcomparedwith a 124 percentincreasefor propertytax.
Between1977and 1984the respectiverevenueincreasesin Ahmadabadwere 199percentand
49 percent. This buoyancyis causedin part by automaticgrowthin the baseas inter-citytrade
expandsin valueand volume. It is causedalsoby localgovernmenteffortsto increaserevenue
by raisingand restructuringoctroirates.
106. A secondreasonfor continuedrelianceon octroiis theabsenceof a sufficientatternative.
Otherformsof taxation,suchas automobiletax, incometax, salestax, and road user charges,
are of only minor importanceto the revenue structureof cities in India and Pakistan.1V
Insufficientgrantsor subsidiesfromthe centraland stategovernmentsof Indiaand Pakistanalso
contributeto local governmentrelianceon octroi. Octroiis the only majortax base (besides
property)not claimedby the higher-levelauthorities.In Bangladesh,and in thoseIndianstates
whereoctroiwas abolished,it was not replacedby an equallyproductiveand buoyantrevenue
source.?' And, in India and Pakistanthe octroiis morepoliticalyacceptablethan road user
charges.

If/

Recentproposalshave centeredon the enbyf4 a * replacement. Thi tax would be collectedfiom sellers as an
ad valoremrateagainstgoodsimportd fromousie the taxngjursdiction. It does eliminatethe octroi
cheokposs,but till has the undesirablefure of discrimiatin aginst goodsthatare not localy produced,and
imposinga substantialadministrive burden. Nath (1988) provides a helpfuldiscussion.
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Schroeder (1989) reports thatthe octoi was replacodby a compenating grnt in Bangladesh,but thatthe grnt
was neitherequal in yield, nor was it as buoyant.
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107. Besidesoctroi, some Indian local authoritieslevy a vehicle and passengerentrance
charge. Citiesin othercountrieshavecomparablecharges,but theseappearto be linkedmainly
to the provisionof publicbus terminalfacilities(for example,in Indonesiaand Jamaica),and
to the airport departuretax. In the evaluationof an entrancecharge,one must distinguish
betweentax relatedto road transportand tax relatedto air travel.
108. A publicbus terminaltax is efficientif it coversthe marginalcost imposedby eachbus
or passengerusingthe station. If terminaltaxexceedsthe marginalcost,it willintroducea bias
in favor of privateautomobilesand reducebus passengertraffic. The extentof sucha loss in
efficiencydependson price elasticityof demandfor inter-citytransport. Thereis littlereason
to use this tax base, even if elasticityis low and efficiencyloss is minimal. It is narrowand
subjectto fluctuations,administration
is difficult,and revenueis negligible.Higherautomotive
taxationis a betteralternativeongroundsof efficiencyand revenue-raising.Automotivetaxation
is also lilcelyto be less regressive,since higher-incomepeople tend to use motor vehicles,
whereaslower-incomepeopleoftenare restrictedto publictransportation.
109. In a numberof countriesforeignvehiclesare chargedfor theirperiodof stay. This is
a minor source of revenue in YugoslaviaPls,
and in Nepal, where it is primarilya tax on
commercialvehicleswithIndianregistration.In Tanzania,this taxis leviedat a flatrate on cars
(payablein $US)for a shorttermpermit,but commercialvehiclespay a variablefee according
to truck size. For the amountof revenue raised, the systemis complicatedand provides
considerableincentivefor evasion.
110. A numberof minor taxes/licensesare levied on the movementof goods and people.
Indiaand Nepalchargea goods or rowe permit tax on commercialvehicles- eitheron a per
kilometerbasis or as an annual fee. Other examplesare a special tax on heavy loads in
Yugoslavia,a provincialcommercialroute license fee in Indonesia,and a fee for driver's
licensesin all countries. These chargesare levied primarilyfor regulationrather than for
revenue.
111. A relatedcaseis the administration
of airportchargesin Tanzania.Threesetsof charges
are levied: (1) a fee for airport use; (2) a passengerdepartureservicecharge;and (3) a civil
aviationfee for regulationand certificationof aircraft,pilots,and mechanics.Thetotalamount
due in 1986was equal to about 10 percentof totalroad user tax in that year. However,only
about 53 percentof the amountdue was actuallycollected(an estimated63 percentfrom the
landingand parkingfee, 51 percentfrom the passengerdeparturefee, and 30 percentfromthe
civilaviationfee). Thereasonscitedfor the poorrevenuecollectionare lackof incentive(there
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In Yugoslivia,theprocecdsar distributedamongthe republicsaccordingto mainroadmileagein each.
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is no relationshipbetweenamountc-illectedand airport expenditure),and a lack of adequate
controlprocedures.
Toml
112. Tollsare viewedas a controlon urban trafficor as a revenueinstrument. In LDCs,
however,toll systemsmaynot be effective. Tollsare not generallyan appropriateinstrument
for congestionpricing. For a toll systemto work, roadwayentry and exit points must be
limited. With the exceptionof a few limited-access
expressways,this is typicallynot the case
for congestedurban streets. Further, toll collectionis costly to administerand may itself
contributeto congestionby creatinga bottleneckat the tollgate. New electronicmetering
systems avoid this problem, but the technologyis too complicatedfor most low income
countries. As a revenuesource,tollsmaybe adequatefor financingbridges,tunnels,or special
urbanexpressways,but probablynot road systems.
113. Comparedwith otherroad user charges,tolls do not generatemuchrevenuein LDCs,
and theiradministrativecostappearsto be luigh.Yugoslaviahas the mostextensivenationaltoll
road financingsystemof the countriesstudied. Tolls generateabout 18 percentof totalroad
user charge revenue, with responsibilityfor the system dividedbetweencentral and local
(republic)government. The ex-,rience of one contractor,operatinga sectionof the Beigrade
roadway, is that collectioncost equals about one-third of total revenue collected. The
governmentestimatesthatevasionand operatorerrorscost approximately6 percentof potential
revenue.
114. Tanzaniaalso has an extensivetoll road system. Toll stationsare locatedat 13points
aroundthe nation, and generateabout 3.5 percentof total road user charge revenue. The
collectionrate is only60 percent,owingto the corruptionthatstemsfrompoorfinancialcontrols
and collectors'low wages. Thepoor financialcontrolis due to monitoringdifficultyat remote
stationsand to the absenceof any way to accuratelycheckthe amountof vehicletraffic. It has
been suggestedthat the toll systembe replacedby an increasein the fuel tax. Theproposalhas
the merit of easier administrationand a 100 percent collectionrate, but the (political)
disadvantageof affecutngthe price of gasoline.
115. Boliviamakesheavyuse of tollsas a revenuesource. Thereare 48 toll stationson interurbanroads. Tollscollectedaccountfor 6 percentof totalroad user charges,even thoughthe
collectionrate is onlyabout 60 percent. Evasionis largelyattributedto the abuseof powerby
toll boothoperators. One estimateplacesthe additionalincomeof toll boothoperatorsat six
times the nationalaverageincome. Compliancecost is extremelyhigh- it is estimatedthat the
value of time lost waitingto pay toll is four timesthe revenuecollected.
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116. In mostcountries,tollsare relatedto financinga specificroador bridgeproject,or they
roadsand bridges. Tollstendto be a minorrevenuesource,and
are imposedon limited-access
mayor maynot be earmarkedfor roadwayexpenditure.In India,for example,tollson national
roadsare paidto the nationalgovernmentgeneralaccount,lessa 12percentcollectionfee,while
tollson certainstateroadsor bridgesare dedicatedto financingthosefacilities. Administrative
problemsseem to be common. The collectionrate is reportedto be about 40 percenton toll
due to e4uipmentfailureand fVbmwal
roadsand bridgesin Ghana,becauseof undercollection
exemptionsby collectors. In Argentina,whereuse of tolls is minimal,evasionis thoughtto be
high because of the toll booth operators'low salaries, and becauseof the absenceof toll
collectionmonitoring.0
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The collectionrate in HongKongis 99perct wherethe tollsare elctronicallyadminist.
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IV. REFORM OPrIONS
117. The transportsectorhas high untappedrevenuepotential. The levelof transporttax is
equalto 1.7 percentof the GDP in the 20 countriescompared. The individualpercentagecan
vary greatly. The effectivetax rate in Argentinaand in CostaRicais over 3 percent.
118. Many of the administrativereforms necessaryto increaserevenue intake from the
transport sector are feasible and are within the capabilitiesof most LDC tax authorities.
However,the revenueimpactfromtheseactionsalonewillnotlead to full realizationof revenue
potential. The big returns are from the combinationof administrativeand policy changes.
Simplification
of the tax structurewillmakeadministrationeasierandin somecaseswillreduce
the incentivefor evasion. It is broadeningthe tax base and rationalizingthe rate structurethat
will increaserevenuemostsignificantly.However,suchchangesare not easysincemanyof the
currentpolices wereput in place to satisfyother macroeconomic
and politicalobjectives.For
example:
*
*
*
*

Motor fuel pricingis controlledfor politicaland equityreasons,withthe result
that gasolineis subsidizedratherthan taxedin somecountries;
Automobilesalestax is drivenby foreignexchangeand equityconcerns,as well
as by revenueconsiderations;
Automobileregistrationhas primarilya regulatorygoal;
Customscorruptionis so institutionalized
in some countriesthat it is almosta
nationalpolicy.

Thus, strengthening
transportsectortaxationdependson tradeoffsbetweengoodtransportsector
taxationand thesemacropolicies.
119. The best methodsfor improvingtransportsector taxationare reviewedbelow. Two
themesunderliethis discuLsson.First, policyand administrativereformsmustgo together;the
tax structure must be corrected before the administrationcan be redesigned. Second,
governmentsshoulddesignpoliciesthat increasethe expectedcost of evasionand reducethe
incentivesto non-compliance.
IT Rate Iz&cJ
120. High tax rates providethe incentiveto evadeor to avoid tax payment. They invite
corruption of public officials by making bribery viable, and they encouragesmuggling.
Increasingtax rates may also causeconsumersor producersto curtailactivityto a pointwhere
revenueis actualy reduced. A keyquestionis whethertransporttax and roaduser chargescan
be reducedwithoutcompromisingeconomicpolicy,and if rates were lowered,wouldthe gain
be equalto the economicpolicycost?
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121. The price of motor fuel is the central issue. The real motor fuel tax rate should be
viewed as the ratio of revenue collectedto taxable sales valuedat a non-subsidizedlevel. Using
this calculation, the tax rate on motor fuel is very low in many developingcountriesand negative
in some. Fuel is often subsidizedbecause of perceptionsof equity, general price impacts, and
the potential political cost of allowing the fuel price to rise.
122. Bearing in mind the reasons for the present motor fuel taxation system, what would be
gained from increasing the real fuel tax rate?
*

The amount of gas tax revenue would increase in proportion to price elasticityof
demand for motor fuel. To the extent reduced truck hauling and private
automobile use curtailed gasoline consumption - by taking the place of rail
shipmentand public transportation- revenue from all taxes on motor vehicles
would be reduced.
A foreign exchange gain could be realized in oil-importingcountries.

*

There would be a general shift of nationalresources away from transport to other
sectors of the economy.

*

The return from smugglinglower priced fuel across national boundaries would
be reduced or eliminated. Other anomaliesassociatedwith low fuel prices might
also be corrected. For example, in Tanzania, carrying fuel to the countrysideis
not profitable, because transportationcosts outweigh the fuel-carryinggain.

3

Motor fuel tax collectionrate is virtually 100 percent, with low administrativeand
compliancecosts. The shift to higher motor fuel tax (and presumablyto lower
tax on somethingelse), is thus a gain in adminis aMYcefficiency.

123. Tax rates on the purchase of motor vehicles and parts are another pricing issue. The
reasons for the high rates typical in most developingcountriesare: (1) automobilesare a luxury
and a differentiallyhigher tax rate on their purchase is progressive; (2) high tax rates discourage
automobile consumptionand redirect consumer savings into more productive investments;(3)
the country may benefitfrom less congestion,foreign exchangesavings, reduced use of imported
motor fuel, and less demand for public investment in roadways; and (4) motor vehicles imported or domesticallyproduced - are easily reached by the tax administrationsystem, and
in that sense are an easy source of revenue.
124. There is no compelling argument for lowering tax rates on the purchase of motor
vehicles. It is true that evasion incentives increase with higher rates, especially if detection
probability is low or if the penalty is not severe. Evasion is relatively easy in Central American
countries, where overland entry from an automobile producing country is possible. But this
probably argues less for a reductionin rates than for a tighteningof administration. Conversely,
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some countries (such as Ghana), already have very low motor vehicle tax rates and can
potentiallyrealize greater revenue from the transport sector.
125. The annual license tax and the registration fee on motor vehicles are a third issue
concerningrates. On the one hand, there are arguments, such as in Ghana, that increasesin the
annual license tax reduce compliance. There are real costs to a reduction in compliance,
includinga loss of control over safety inspections,automobileinsurance, informationabout the
motor vehicle fleet, and checks on ownership transfers. Yet there is evidence(such as in India),
that a higher rate (accompaniedby proper enforcement), can increase compliance. In either
case, the rate levels are low on the annual license tax and on the registration fee, making it
questionable that the tax rate makes much difference in the decision to pay. One other
considerationis important: some local governmentsderive a substantialshare of their revenue
from such taxes and fees. Lower rates would compromisetheir financial position.
126. High rates are not a major problem underlyingthe failure of transport to realize its full
revenue potential. The most important base - motor fuel - is probably undertaxedin most
countries, and a rate increase could likely be absorbed with little, if any, loss in collection
efficiency. The switcn to an ad valorem rate could preserve the gas tax revenue position, and
spare governments from periodically having to raise rates. To discourage smuggling, motor
vehicle tax rates might be loweredfor sales tax purposes. However, enforcementis a better way
of discouragingevasion. Someone who evaded a high tax rate is not likely to comply simply
because the rate has been halved. For the other forms of transport tax, the rates/chargesare
presendy so low that it seems unlikelycompliancewill be affected by further reductions.
I
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127. A broad tax base with few exemptionsand a singlerate offer the best possibilitiesfor tax
enfxui.cmentand the fewest avenues for avoidance. Rate differentiation and exemptions
introducenonuniformity. A nonuniformtax systemgives payers an opportunityto avoid taxation
by changing or appearing to change production or consumption. Decreases in the uniformity
of a tax system increase the gap between actual tax collectionand revenue potential.
128. This is not to say there should be no rate differentiation in transport taxation.
Differentialrates and a program of exemptionsare common, and exist for important reasons.
Some of the most common are:
*
*
*
*

A higher tax rate for petrol than diesel;
Motor fuel tax exemption for government, agriculture, and other preferred
sectors;
Preferential import duty and sales tax treatment for government, commercial
companies, diplomats, vehicles purchased for foreign-financedprojects, and
small, fuel efficient cars;
Governmentvehicles exempted from tolls;
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Highertaxationon goodsin transitthan on thoselocallyproduced.
129. The differentialtax treatmentof motorfuels,leadingto variouspumppricesfor diesel,
premium,and regularpetrolhastwo consequences.First, it appearsto encourageadulteration.
However,this form of evasioncan oftenbe controlledthroughfuel coloration,or the use of
specialadditives. Second,the lowerchargefor dieselfuel benefitsthe groupof usersimposing
the greatestcost on highwayuse. Equityis the justificationfor this rate differentiation.A
higherpricefor gasolinesubsidizesdieselconsumption(andthereforepublictransportation),
and
homefuels, suchas kerosene. The problemswith differentialrates for motorfuels are wellknown: someprivateautomobilesuse diesel;somepublictransportationis fueledby gasoline;
dieselpoweredvehiclesmaybe fueledby kerosene;cheaperroadtransportchargesdiscriminate
againstthe rail systemandimposea highcoston roadmaintenance;and gasolineprices maybe
set belowmarketprices (meaningthat the subsidyruns to diesel,to homeheating,and to the
entireroad sector).
130. It is difficultto justifythe lowerprice and the lower tax rate on diesel. It is not clear
that equity is achieved, revenue is lost, and subsidizingthe largest beneficiaryof road
expenditure(per mile)is inefficient. This is anothercase wherepoliticsare pammount.
131. The octroiin Indiais an importantdifferentialtax. It imposesa tax on goodsin transit,
but not on goodsproducedwithinlocaljurisdictionalboundaries. As discussedearlier, octroi
encouragesevasionand avoidance.The highcompliancecostand subjectiveassessmentmethod
encouragepay offs to evadetax. To avoidtax, businessactivityhas begunto developoutside
jurisdictionalboundaries.Theseare onlya fewof the flawsassociatedwithoctroi,butgive the
flavorof whatis wrong.
132. Finally, too many exemptionsare a majorsource of nonuniformity.The greater the
numberof exempt categoriesand the higher the rate on taxed categories,the greater the
probabilityof evasionand avoidance. Theexemptionof small-enginecars fromimportdutyin
Ghana,and the exemptionof commercialvehiclesfromimportdutyin Indonesiaare examples
of an incentivefor misdeclaration.Governmentexemptionsfromvehicletax from motorfuel
tax, and even from toils is common. Such exemptionsform an incentivefor government
overuseof transportservicesand for the transferenceof specialtreatmentto othersectors. They
inviteabuseand provideuncertainequityand efficiencygains.
Mm
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133. Complex tax systems increase tax administrationcost, weaken tax administration
effectiveness,and imposea high compliancecost on taxpayers. In short, complexityincites
evasion,lowers the probabilityof detection,and reducestransporttax collection. The high
compliancecost imposedon taxpayersis usuallydue to the outsidehelp needed,to the onerous
bookkeepingrequirements,or to the inordinateamountof time spent paying the tax. High
compliancecost resultsin increasedtax avoidanceor tax evasion.

39

134. The complicatedtariff structurein mostlow-incomecountriesinvolvesnumerousrates
and classifications
for goods. Thegreat amountof timecustomsofficialsmust spendon goods
classificationcosts time that couldbe spent on moreproductiveactivities,such as valuation.
Complicatedtariff structuresalso lowerthe probabilityof detectionfor importersundervaluing
goods,and create moreavenuesfor goods reclassification
and lowerduties. A structurewith
only a few rates and classifications
wouldclosetheseavenues.
135. Sales tax also couldbe simplified,but this mayinvolvetradeoffswith otherobjectives
of tax reform. Excisetax, whichgenerallyis leviedon a specificrather than an ad valorem
basis, is probablythe easiestof the indirecttaxesto administer.Its assessmentand collection
are easilycontrolled,sincethe tax is leviedwhena goodis moved. However,becauseexcise
is levied at an early stage of the productionprocess, it cascadesforward and creates price
distortions. A manufacturer'ssales tax generallyis levied on an ad valorembasis and is
thereforeelastic. The tax is relativelyeasy to administer,but is subjectto the samecascading.
The moremodemapproachesto generalsalestation are the value-addedtax or the retailsales
tax. Of the countriesin this sample,Yugoslaviaand Indiamakesome use of a retailsalestax
on automobilepurchases;ArgentinaandBoliviause a value-addedtax on automobilepurchases;
the othercountriesimposea sales tax on importsor use a manufacturer'ssalestax.
136. The Indian,Pakistani,and Nepaleseoctroiis a form of salestax that is complicatedand
difficultto administer. Someof the studieson octroiproposereplacingit withan equalyield
tax on motor fuel, whichwouldsimplifythe localtax system. Otherstudiesproposean entry
tax, which wouldplace a sales tax surchargeon goods not locallyproduced;or a business
propertytax. Neitherof thesetaxeswouldmakethe systemany less complex.
137. Mostcountrieshavesomesort of salestax on the transferof usedvehicles. This is often
a local governmenttax, suchas in Indonesia.Transfertax on usedautomobilesbringsin little
revenue,is notoriouslydifficultto administer,and is oftencomplicated.
138. Finally, the most complicatedtanwport sector charges are the license tax and the
registrationfee. The administrationof thesechargesrequirs followinga long procedure,and
involvesa lot of manualchecldng. The simplificationof the licensetax and the systemof the
registrationfee is beginning. Proposedand actual changes in administrativepractice are
describedbelow.
Do Inc
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139. In theorya tapayer is morewillingto pay if a visiblebenefitis attachedto the tax or
charge, and if there is no free ride. In this case, tax rates may be set higher with the
expectationof a correspondingincreasein rates. Thisleadsto the questionof whethercollection
in the transportsector couldbe increasedby earmarlingroad user taxationentirelyto benefit
road users.
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140. From data presented in the case studies, there i- no evidence that collection efficiency
is higher in countries where road user taxation covers a greater share of roadway cost (or that
collection efficiency is lower where road user taxation covers more than full roadway cost).
Basic causes of evasion and avoidance come from within the tax structure and the tax
administration- areas that must be improved before developinga program that will stimulate
a greater willingness to pay for road use.
141. There is another way to look at the incentives argument. Earmarking taxes may not
increase willingnessto pay, but it may increase willingnessto collect. The collection authority
at Tanzania's airport saw no relationship between the amount of tax collected and the
expenditure allocation for airport services. In India, interstate cooperationin the collectionof
motor vehicle sales tax faces face a similar problem - the policing state may receive none of
the benefits of the increased enforcement.
Complince Cost

142. The question of motor fuel taxation, which usually has a 100 percent collection rate, is
whether governments can base proposals for raising gasoline tax on a user benefits argument.
The answer, from Table 1, implies it would be difficultto sell. Motor fuel tax already accounts
for a substantialshare of road expenditurein most of the countries considered.
143. Tax paymentwill be resistedwhen the cost of complianceis high. Procedures, including
recordkeeping (as with India's modified value added program), may be too complicated, or
corruption may invite noncompliance. Compliancecosts for motor fuel tax and excise taxes on
motor vehicle production are lower than for other charges.
144. Corruptioneffects several types of charges. In terms of the amount of money involved,
import duty on automobiles is probably the biggest problem. Tolls are a problem because of
the lack of toll booth operator supervision. In Bolivia the cost of compliance(measuredin time
lost), was as much as four times the revenue collected. There is no satisfactorysolution to the
toll problem for low-income countries. Electronic metering devices can solve some of the
evasion problems. The substitutionof a general tax for tolls, as proposed in Tanzania, is a
solution to the administrationproblem, but it fails to charge users for the cost of a particular
road service.
145. The registration fee and annual license tax impose a heavy time cost on those who
comply. Numerous forms must be filled out and the taxpayermust demonstratecompliancewith
seveal other regulations. Such cross-checking is a good enforcement instrument, but is
burdensomeenough to discourage tax compliance. The payment rate is low in most countries.
However, the annual license tax will continueto be levied - it is an availablesource of revenue
and is levied on an expandingbase.
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146. To simplifythese chargesand reducecomplianceand admli Aationcosts, a one-time
paymenthasbeenproposedby severalIndianstates. Underthisprograi-, privatevehicleowners
wouldpay a lifetimeannualchargeat the time of registration.2wThis approachdramaticaly
reducescomplianceand administrativecostsand, whenimposedin relationto the valueof the
vehicles,a higherrate may seemless objectionable.The lifetimechargedoeshave important
flaws: (1) data fromthe annuallicensetax couldno longerbe usedas a recordof the number
of vehicleson the road; (2) the annuallicensetax couldno longerbe usedto forcethe recording
of ownershipchanges;and (3) withoutthe annuallicensetax, it wouldnot be as easy to do an
annualcheckon insurancecoverage. Anotherproblemis that the cost of this programwould
be prohibitivefor most commercialvehicles. One-timepaymentwouldprobablyhave to be
limitedto privateautomobilesand two-wheelers.Thus, some of the potentialadministrative
savingswouldnot be realized.
147. A suggestedapproachto annuallicensetax simplification
in Tanzaniawas to reducethe
numberof vehiclecategoriesin the tax structureand to reduce the tax rate. Unificationof
severalpermit, license, and registrationcertificateswas recommendedfor Nepal to reduce
compliancecost and eliminatesome duplicationof administrativeeffort. Neither of these
proposalswas implemented.
148. Someinroadsto improvedadministrationhave been madein MaharashtraState(India).
Recordson vehicleregistrationand licenseshavebeen computerized,billingsare automatically
generated,and delinquencylists are printed. To reducecompliancecost,paymentmaybe made
at banks.
149. Severalother administrative
practicesprovidecluesthat mighthelp improvethe annual
licensetax. In Yugoslavia,tough enforcementappearsto generatea lower evasionrate. In
India, where enforcementis tougheron commercialvehiclesthan on private vehicles,the
evasionrate on the commercialvehiclesis muchlower. Ghana'sflat rate tax, whileeasy and
cheapto administer,may not be so appealingfrom a benefitspoint-of-view(thatis, heavier
vehiclesshouldpay more, and so on).
Enforcementand Penalty
150. Evasionis discouragedby a highlikelihoodof detectionandby a severepenalty. Of the
countriesin this sample,Yugoslaviaseemsto have concentratedmoston the penaltyapproach,
and little evasionis reported- even of the annuallicensetax, whenneithera dated number
plate nor a displayedregistrationstickeris required. Successcouldbe due to a no-nonsense
approachto dealingwith evaders,the fact that there is often littlepersonalgain from evasion
in a socialiststate,or simplythat the government'sstatisticsare not accurateenoughto identify
ZQI

Since 1987, the Governmentof Mahamshtrahas levied a one time charge on two-wheelersand tricycles. Ouaat
and U.P. have adopted the one time systemfor personaivehicles, and Tamil Nadu andU.T. Delhi will introduce
this system oon (Governmentof India, 1989, Chapter III).
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the amountof evasionoccurring. In none of the othercountrieswas penaltyreportedto be an
effectivedeterrent.
151. Mosteffortsto controlevasionhaveconcentratedon increasingprobabilityof detection.
This requires improvementsin collection,recordkeeping,assessmentof tax liability, and
identificationof those liableto pay the tax.
InterfoveimmentalRelatiops
152. In mostcountries,the decisionabouthowto divideresponsibility
for taxingthe transport
sector betweencentraland subnationalgovernmentdependson whetherthere is a traditionof
localgovernmenttaxation. In India's federalsystem,wherethereis sucha tradition,about45
percentof all road user chargesaccrueto local government. Wherecountriesoperateunder
highly centralized fiscal systems, local governmentmay not have well developed tax
administrationsystems.Undersuchcircumstances,taxationof the transportsectorremainswith
the centralgovernment.
153. Most low-incomecountriesare decentralizingtheir revenuesystemsand are searching
for revenuesourcesthat are appropriatefor administrationat the local level. A first step in
evaluatingthe feasibilityof localleveltransporttaxis an identificationof the problemsthathave
ansen with local taxationin general and with local transporttax in particular. The basic
problemscenteron the inabilityof local governmentto effectivelyadministertransporttax, the
difficultyof inter-localtax enforcementcooperation,and the case with whichlocalresidentsor
businessescan legaUyavoidpaymentby makingpurchasesor sales in otherjurisdictions.
154. Fromthis, and frombasicprinciplesof multi-levelfinance,one mightoffer the following
guidelinesfor defininga local governmentrole in transport sector taxation. First, local
governmentin developingcountriescan be mosteffectivein taxingroad use and in controlling
vehiclelicensingandvehicleregistration.Motorvehicleproductiontax andpurchasetax should
be leftto the centralgovernment.Thereis no placefor the taxationof goodsin transitat either
level. The taxation of motor fuel presents a special case. Becauseof macroeconomic
considerations- revenueneeds, foreignexchangeproblems,and the politicalsensitivityof
gasolineprices - tax on motor fuel will continueto be a central governmentlevy in most
developingcountries.However,thereis a casefor localgovernmentsharingin therevenue,and
evenfor localgovernmentpartakingin the rate setting. The casefor allowinglocalgovernment
participationrestson four factors: (1) motorfuelis a growingtax baserelatedto urbanization;
(2) localofficialswillhavean ideawhatis fair and of urbanconsumers'willingnessto pay; (3)
local govemmentmust bear part of the street maintenanceand taffic controlcosts associated
with morevehicleuse; and (4) responsibilityfor pollutionand congestioncontrolusuallyrests
withlocal government.
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155. Second,local or stategovernmentsin LDCs shouldnot have the authorityto choose
differenti rates and bases. Thisis not becausedifferendaltaxationin differentregionsof the
countryis a bad idea, but becauselocaladministratorsmay not be up to the job. Wherelocal
governmentsin Indiahave set differentialrates, leakageshave occurredbecauseof problems
arisingfrom interstatetrade. In Yugoslavia,wherelocal governmentis given similarfreedom
to set rates, a muchless severeproblemwith leakagesis reported.
156. Third, it is useful to have some transport sector taxes administeredby the local
government.Localfamiliarityand accessare importantto the identificationand assessmentof
certaintaxes, suchas tolls, vehicletransfers,and annuallicenses. The alternativeis a shared
tax system where central governmentassumes responsibilityfor all or most taxes on
automobiles,andin returnguaranteeslocalgovernmenta shareof theproceeds. Thereare some
problemswith this approach:
*
*
D

It does not enablelocal governmentsto tax road users at a higherrate, whena
higherrate maybe needed,for example,in cities;
;n the assessmentandenforcementprocessis lost, for example,in the
FamiLiarity
identificationof thoseliablefor motorvehiclelicensetax, and in the use offlying
squadsto enforcelicensing,registration,and the sale of specialpermits;
The centralgovernmentmay withholdor reduce the local share of revenue,a
problempresentlybeing facedin Argentina.

44
REFERENCES

Archarya, ShankmrN., "Aspectsof the BlackEconomyin India", Governmentof India, Ministry
of Finance, New Delhi, 1985.
Allingham, Michael G. and Agnar Sandmo, "Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis",
Journal of Public Economics, 1972, 1, pp. 323-338.
Alm, James, Roy Bahl and Matthew N. Murray, "Tax Base Erosion in DevelopingCountries",
EconomicDevelopmentand Cultural Change, forthcoming.
---

"Tax
-, Structure and Tax Compliance", Reviewof EconomicStatistics, forthcoming.

Bahl, Roy, "Tax Reform in Jamaica: Evaluationand Lessons", Bulletinfor Internaioal Pisca
DocurnllftiQg, January, 1990.
Sharma, J.N., "Tax Evasion and Avoidance: A Crucial but Neglected Aspect of Taxation,
Studiesin DomesticFinance",DevelopmentEconomicsDepartment,DevelopmentPolicy
Staff, World Bank, Washington,DC, 1976.
Bird, Richard, "IncomeTax Reformin DevelopingCountries: TfieAdministrativeDimension."
Bulletin for Intemational Fiscal Documentation,1983, 37(1), pp. 3-14.
Clotfelter, Charles T., "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns",
ReviLwof Economicsad Statistics, 1983, 65, pp. 363-373.
Cowell, Frank A., "Tax Evasionwith Labour Income", Journal of Public Economics, 1985,26,
pp. 19-34.
Due, John, Indirect Taxationin DevelopingCountries,revised edition, Baltimore,JohnsHopldns
Press, 1988.
Gillis, Malcolm, 'ComprehensiveTax Reform: The IndonesiaExperience", in MalcolmGillis,
editor, Tax Reform in DevelopingCountries (Durham: Duke UniversityPress, 1989),
pp. 79-114).
Goode, Richard, Government Finance in Developing Countries, Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1984.

The

Government of India, "Vehicle Fleet Modemization and Road User Charges", Ministry of
Surface Transport, February 1989.

45
Herschel, Fredeico J., "Tax Evasion and its Managementin Developing Countries", PublLc
Piace/Finances EUWW,ues,
1978, 33, pp. 232-266.
Holland, Daniel, -Measuringand CombatingTax Evasion", in Prceedings of the 38th Congss
of the Interational Institute of Public Finance, Copenhagen, Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 1982.
Hughes, Gordon, lTheIncidence of Fuel Taxes: %ComparativeStudy of Three Countries",
pp. 533-559, in The Theory of Taxation for Developing Countrie, ed. by David
Newbery and Nicholas Stern (Oxford UniversityPress, 1987).
IntemationalMonetary Fund, Tax Adminitaton in Develoing Countries: Strategiesand Tools

ofIlmlcmnltaimi,
August1989.
LouisBergerIntemational,Inc., Nepl: Studyof the RoadTsort

Industy, July 1987.

McLure, Charles, Jack Mutti, Victor Thuronyi, and Georgt;Zadrow, e Taxaftin oInome
fomMBusines and Capital in Columbia, (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989).
Musgrave, Richard and Peggy Musgrave, Public in Tihe
McGraw Hill, Inc., New York, 1984.

and Practice, fourth edition,

Najundappa,D. M., Rad Use Taxationand Road Financingin the Indian Economy, Bombay:
Jawaharal Nehru Memorial Instituteof DevelopmentStudies, 1973.
Nath, Shyam, "A Substitutefor Octroi: Entry Tax versus Business Property Tax', Econom
and PolilI aiWkI, July 30, 1988, pp. 1579-1581.
Roth, Gabriel, The Private Provision of Public Services in DevelopingCountries, New York,
Oxford UniversityPress, 1987.
Richupan, Somcihai,'Income Tax Evasion: A Review of the MeasurementTechiiques and
Some Estimates for the Developing Countries', International Monetary Fund,
DepartmentalMemorandum,July 1984.
Schroeder, Larry, 'StrengtheningLocal Governmentsin Bangladesh', in FinancingGovernmt
Decntralization: The Case of Bangladesh, chapter 9, edited by Lary Schroeder
(Boulder, Colorado: WestviewPress, 1989).
Shaw, G. K., "Leading Issues of Tax Policy in Developing Countries: The Economic
Problems', in Mm oliticalEcnomy of TiQn, editedby A.T. Peacock and F. Forte
(New York: St. Martin's Press) 1981, pp. 148-162.
Shoup, Carl S., public Financ@,Aldine PublishingCompany, Chicago, 1969.

46
Smith,Roger, "MotorVehicleTaxationin Jamaica",StaffPaperNo. 10, MetropolitanStudies
Program,The MaxwellSchool,SyracuseUniversity,1984.
Smivasan,T. N., "TaxEvasion:A Model",Joumalof PublicF&oomic, 2:1973,pp. 339-346.
Tait, A. A., Value Added Tax: Intenional Practiceand Problem, Washington,D.C.,
IntemationalMonetaryFund, 1988.
Tait, A. A. andDavidMorgan(1980). "GasolineTaxationin SelectedOECDCountries,(197079)", InternationalMonetay Fund, StaffPapers.27(2),pp. 249-279.
Witte,Ann D. and Diane F. Woodbury,"The Effectof Tax Lawsand Tax Administrationon
Tax Compliance:The Caseof the U.S. IndividualIncomeTax', NationalTaz Joumal,
March 1985,38(1),pp. 1-13.
Woodbury, Stephen A., "SubstitutionbetweenWage and NonwageBenefits", Amefi=n
1eonQmicRiBw, March 1983,73(1),pp. 166-181.

Policy Research Working Paper Series

Title

Contact
for paper

Author

Date

WPS963 Growthand WelfareLossesfrom
CarbonEmissionsRestrictions:
A GeneralEquilibriumAnalysis
for Egypt

CharlesR. Blitzer
R. S. Eckaus
SupriyaLahirl
AlexanderMeeraus

August 1992

WDROffice
31393

WPS964 Toxic Releasesby Manufacturing:
WorldPattemsand TradePolicies

RobertE. B. Lucas

August 1992

WDROffice
31393

WPS965 Copingwiththe DisappointingRates WilliamAscher
of Returnon DevelopmentProjects
That Affectthe Environment

August 1992

WDROffice
31393

WPS966 Tradeand the Environment:A Survey Judith M. Dean
of the Literature

August 1992

WDROffice
31393

WPS967 TransitionProblemsin Economic
Reform:Agriculturein the MexicoU.S. FreeTradeAgreement

SantiagoLevy
Swedervan Wijnbergen

August 1992

M. Stroude
38831

WPS968 Biomass

David0. Hall

August 1992

WDROffice
31393

WPS969 Imports,Exports, and Irndustrial
Performancein India, 1970-88

M. AtamanAksoy
HelenaTang

August 1992

M. Shore
31129

WPS970 PoliticalModelsof Macroeconomic Alberto Alesina
Policyand FiscalReform

August1992

E. Khine
39361

WPS971 The Effectsof Democratic
Milan Vodopivec
Determinationof Wages:Theoryand
Evidencefrom Self-ManagedFirms

August 1992

CECTM
37188

WPS972 CommercialEnergyEfficiencyand
the Environment

RobinW. Bates
EdwinA. Moore

September1992

WDROffice
31393

WPS973 HowChangesin the FormerCMEA
Area May Affect International
Tradein Manufactures

Refik Erzan
ChristopherHolmes

September1992

G. Ilogon
33732

WPS974 HowMinilateralTradingArrangementsC. A. Prmo Braga
MayAffect the Post-UruguayRound AlexanderYeats
World

September1992

J. Jacobson
33710

WPS975 Techniquesfor ImprovingClient
Relationsin FamilyPlanning
Programs

GeorgeB. Simmons
SaraKoerber
RuthSimmons

September1992

0. Nadora
31091

WPS976 StrategicManagementof Family
PlanningPrograms

CynthiaP. Green

September1992

0. Nadora
31091

Policy Research Working Paper Series
Contact
for paper

Author

Date

EstelleJames

September1992

D. Evans
37489

CharlesR. Blitzer
WPS978 HowRestrictingCarbonDioxide
and MethaneEmissionsWouldAffect R. S. Eckaus
the IndianEconomy
SupriyaLahiri
AlexanderMeeraus

September1992

WDROffice
31393

WPS979 EconomicGrowthand the
Environment

DennisAnderson

September1992

WDROffice
31393

WPS980 The Environment:A New
Challengefor GATT

PirittaSorsa

September1992

WDROffice
31393

WPS981 After Socialismand Dirigisme:
WhichWay?

AndresSolimano

September1992

S. Falon
37947

WPS982 Microeconomicsof Transformation
in Poland:A Surveyof State
EnterpriseResponses

Brian Pinto
MarekBelka
StefanKrajewski

September1992

S. Husain
37139

WPS983 Legal Reformfor Hungary'sPrivate
Sector

CherylW. Gray
RebeccaJ. Hanson
MichaelHeller

October1992

R. Martic
39065

WPS984 Barriersto Portfolio Investments
In EmergingStockMarkets

AshlDemirgO,-Kunt
HarryHulzinga

October 1992

W. Patrawimolpon
37664

WPS985 RegionalIntegration,Old and
New

Jaimede Melo
ClaudioMontenegro
Arvind Panagariya

October 1992

D. Ballantine
37947

WPS986 The Administrationof RoadUser
Taxesin DevelopingCountries

RoyBahl

October 1992

J. Francis-O'Connor
35205

Title
WPS977 IncomeSecurityfor Old Age:
ConceptualBackgroundand Major

View publication stats

